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ABSTRACT 
The main objective of this thesis is to identify and measure explanatory factors of observed 
credit spreads in the Nordic corporate high yield bond market in the period 2000 – 2012. From 
literature on credit pricing, we found three sources of risk compensation worth investigating; 
default risk, liquidity risk, and market risk. Our high yield sample consists of 323 bond issues, 
whereas 49 defaulted during the period. 
Our spread analysis is twofold. First, we utilize an extended structural credit risk model based 
on the classic model of Merton (1974) to estimate fair bond spreads based solely on the 
expected loss from defaults. Loss given default was attempted to be modeled separately, but 
no systematic relationship was identified, and a static estimate was used instead. 
Second, we attempted to explain the part of the observed credit spreads not explained by 
credit risk using a multivariate OLS-regression. This was done by instrumenting liquidity and 
market risk. 
Our main findings are that default risk can explain as much as 65 percent of the observed 
credit spreads on average. Furthermore, the credit model has significantly lower relative 
mispricing for bonds involved in a credit event, implying that structural characteristics are 
good predictors of credit risk. The part of the credit spread not explained by default risk was 
178 basis points (bps) on average in absolute terms. Our attempt at explaining the variation 
in mispricing with liquidity and market risk was less conclusive, but liquidity proved to be 
significant with a premium of 110 bps for illiquid issuers. 
 
We would like to thank our counselor Thore Johnsen for answering important questions, and 
providing thorough reviews. We would also like to thank Mads T. Solberg at Stamdata for 
providing us with access to their database, and for answering key questions regarding the 
Nordic corporate bond market. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The Nordic corporate high yield bond market represents new and exciting opportunities for 
both investors in search of yield and firms seeking debt financing. However, many questions 
regarding the Nordic market remains unanswered, as the vast majority of existing research 
focus on the US market. Which factors are important when explaining credit spreads for 
Nordic high yield bonds? What types of risks are the investors facing and what are they 
compensated for? Answers to these questions would give valuable guidance to market 
participants, and will be the focus of this thesis. 
The Nordic high yield market has for the last decade transformed from a small regional market 
to a highly developed bond market, and is now the third largest market for corporate High 
Yield bonds in the world. During the period 2005-2014 a total of NOK 660 billion has been 
issued by non-financial corporations in the Nordic market1. Yet, very few issuers are rated by 
a public agency. The practice is that arranging banks’ credit research department publish a 
"shadow rating” based on international rating agency methodologies. The financial crisis in 
2008 and the European sovereign debt crisis served as a reminder to investors of the 
downside of investing in risky debt securities. At the same time, these periods have resulted 
in increased regulatory requirements and increased funding costs. This has fueled the 
corporate HY bond market’s growth by becoming an increasingly competitive source of debt 
capital, in addition to an exciting asset class for private and institutional investors in search 
for yield. 
While a significant amount of research has been done on the US corporate bond market, the 
number of studies on the Nordic bond market is limited. The majority of bonds in the Nordics 
are traded over-the-counter (OTC), which makes the market less transparent due to retention 
of price quotes and trade details by the intermediary. Access to sufficient data is therefore a 
challenging process and is likely a reason for the relatively limited number of studies on the 
Nordic bond market. 
Former master theses have studied interesting aspects of the Norwegian bond market, such 
as the performance of the market, default and recovery rates, and prediction of defaults. For 
instance, Luo and Tegnander (2012) analyze the performance of the Norwegian HY market in 
                                                          
1 Source: Stamdata  database 
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the period January 2008 – June 2012, by creating a HY index and measuring holding period 
returns. They find that their index yielded a compounded annual growth rate of 4.50 percent 
and outperformed the Oslo Stock Exchange Benchmark Index. Haugland and Brekke (2010) 
identified and analyzed default and recovery rates in the period January 2005 – June 2010 
and found that a great number of bonds were involved in credit events in the wake of the 
financial crisis, and that the oil service sector experienced the highest default frequency and 
loss given defaults. Grøstad (2013) studies determinants of defaults in the period 2006-2013, 
where he uses a multivariate statistical model to predict default events with explanatory 
variables from the SEBRA-basic bankruptcy prediction model developed by the Central Bank 
of Norway. When reading through previous theses, we discovered that several studies 
touched upon core parts of credit spreads. Nevertheless, none of the previous master theses’ 
investigates the explanatories of the actual bond pricing, measured by the coupon rate above 
the risk-free rate. This is however done by Sæbø (2015), Chief Treasurer at Folketrygdefondet. 
He investigates credit spreads for a sample containing both high yield and investment grade 
bonds in the Norwegian market for the years 2008 and 2009. The limited amount of research 
in the field and the opportunity given by access to a new and exciting dataset from Stamdata 
evoked our interest to analyze this aspect of the bond market. 
The main objective of this thesis is to identify and measure explanatory factors of observed 
credit spreads at issue in the corporate HY bond market in the period 2000 – 2012. The area 
of research is highly relevant for credit market participants. For bond issuers it is beneficial to 
have knowledge of the credit spread dynamics to reduce the funding cost, and to better 
evaluate the most viable source of finance. For bond investors as for equity investors, it is 
critical to secure sufficient compensation related to the risk carried, which in the credit 
market is a function of the credit spread and the underlying credit risk. A deep understanding 
of the two is therefore crucial to succeed with credit investments. 
The spread analysis is twofold. First we create a structural credit model to estimate fair 
spreads based only on the expected loss from defaults. We also attempt to model loss given 
default (LGD) separately to improve the credit model. Subsequently, we subtract the model 
spreads from the actual spreads to separate the part of the spread that is explained by default 
risk from the part that is due to other factors. The unexplained part is argued to include 
compensation for risk aversion, illiquidity, migration, and market risk, and is attempted to be 
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explained with a multivariate regression analysis. This analytical method follows that 
performed by Sæbø (2015) and Eom, Helwege, and Huang (2004) among others, but is 
differentiated by its attempt to do an individual estimation of LGD for each issue of debt. 
Due to lack of data on trading prices, the analysis is based only on observed spreads at issue. 
We assume that the bond is issued at par, and hence that credit spread can be derived from 
the coupon rate. Only bonds issued by public companies are included, as the structural model 
applied in the spread estimation requires equity market variables. The final HY sample 
consists of 323 bonds, whereas 49 defaulted during the period. 
Our main finding is that default risk can explain as much as 65 percent of the observed credit 
spreads on average, which is significantly higher than the mispricing of 21.5 percent found by 
Sæbø (2015). Furthermore, the credit model has significantly lower relative mispricing for 
bonds involved in a credit event, implying that structural characteristics are good predictors 
of credit risk. The part of the credit spread not explained by default risk was 178 basis points 
(bps) on average in absolute terms. Explaining the variation in mispricing with liquidity and 
market risk was less conclusive, but liquidity proved to be significant with a premium of 110 
bps for illiquid issuers. 
The structure of this thesis is as following: Chapter 2 presents basic bond theory required to 
follow the discussions and analysis in the paper. Chapter 3 gives a description of the Nordic 
bond market, with main emphasis on the Norwegian market. Chapter 4 presents more 
advanced concepts and literature on credit pricing. Chapter 5 describes the data used in the 
analysis. Chapter 6 describes the methodology used to reach estimated bond spreads. 
Chapter 7 presents and analyzes the estimated credit spreads from our model, before we 
conclude in chapter 8. 
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2 BASIC BOND THEORY 
In this chapter we will present basic bond theory in order to set the backdrop for the coming 
analysis. Theory regarding bond characteristics and credit risk will be covered. 
2.1 What is a bond? 
A bond is a debt security where an investor (bond holder) loans money to an entity (issuer), 
most often a corporation, a government, or a local government structure. The issuer of the 
bond makes periodical payments (coupons or interest) to the bond holder, and pays a 
principal through installments or at the end of the period called the maturity date. The owner 
of a bond can often trade the bond in the secondary market. 
2.2 Bonds in relation to firms’ capital structure 
Firms are able to choose from a range of different options to finance their operations. The 
two main categories are debt and equity, whereas debt is always repaid before equity in case 
of bankruptcy. There is also a difference in priority within the debt category in case of default, 
which affects the amount expected to recover at default and the cost of capital of each type. 
The most secure form of debt is senior secured, which is secured with collateral. This means 
that the creditor has the right to certain assets in case of bankruptcy. The full capital structure 
priority ranking is summarized in table 2.1 below. 
Table 2.1: Capital structure characteristics 
 
 
2.3 Types of bonds 
Bonds are often classified according to three main characteristics; their maturity, 
convertibility, and return type. 
Capital structure ranking
Priority in a 
default
Expected recovery 
in a default
Capital cost
Senior Secured Highest Highest Lowest
Senior Unsecured
Subordinated
Preffered Stock
Common Stock Lowest Lowest Highest
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A bond with a defined maturity of more than one year is simply called a bond, while bonds 
with maturity of less than a year is called a certificate. A bond without a defined maturity date 
is called a perpetual bond. Bonds can similarly to a mortgage have both a fixed and floating 
rate payment structure. Floating rate bonds are normally linked to a benchmark government 
interest rate, like the NIBOR in Norway or LIBOR in GB. However, floating rate bonds can also 
be linked to other economic indicators such as inflation, macroeconomic indicators, stock 
indices, and so forth. 
Other, more exotic bonds, include convertible, callable, and puttable bonds. The bondholder 
of a convertible can choose at maturity whether to redeem their bond for principal or equity 
shares. This enables bondholders to gain an upside, and hence such bonds pay less interest 
than similar plain bonds. A callable bond can be redeemed by the issuer prior to its maturity, 
while a holder of a puttable bond can force the issuer to repurchase the bond at 
predetermined dates and price prior to maturity. 
2.4 Credit spread 
A credit spread is defined as the difference between the yield on two debt securities with the 
same characteristics, but different credit risk. For bonds issued at par, the norm is to calculate 
the spread between the coupon of the corporate bond and a corresponding government 
bond. The latter is used as a proxy for a risk free rate. This way, the spread is a measure of 
the market premium of the risky debt security. We make the assumption that all bonds are 
issued at par as we have a cross-sectional dataset with only observations at issue and eventual 
default. If we had observations of continuous bond prices, a spread between the yield to 
maturity of the bond and a relevant government bond would be more suitable, as the 
assumption that the yield to maturity is equal the coupon would not be valid. 
2.5 Credit risk 
Credit risk is defined as the risk of the bond issuer failing to meet a contractual payment 
obligation. The failure to meet a promised payment is a default. 
Moody´s define default in four distinct types (Sun, Munves, & Hamilton, 2012) 
1. A missed or delayed disbursement of interest and/or principal, including delayed 
payments made within a grace period 
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2. Bankruptcy, administration, legal receivership, or other legal blocks (perhaps by 
regulators) to the timely payment of interest and/or principal 
3. A distressed exchange occurs where: (i) the issuer offers debt holders a new security 
or package of securities that amount to a diminished financial obligation (such as 
preferred or common stock, or debt with a lower coupon or par amount, lower 
seniority or longer maturity); or (ii) the exchange had the apparent purpose of 
helping the borrower avoid default. 
4. Government bailouts enacted to prevent a credit event 
 
By buying and holding a risky bond, bond holders require to be compensated for credit risk, 
i.e. what they can expect to lose from holding the bond. This can we viewed as a function of 
3 factors; (1) The cumulative probability that the issuer defaults during its bonds lifetime, (2) 
the percentage amount recovered should the bond default, and (3) the bond holder’s 
exposure at default. As we are only looking at bullet bonds2, we assume that exposure at 
default always is equal to 100 %. This compensation is formulated as the expected default 
loss of the bond, and is often defined as the product of the probability of default and loss 
given default.  
Spread ≈ Expected default loss =  
1
T
× CPD × LGD =
1
T
× PD × (1 − RR) 
Where CPD is the cumulative probability of default from 0T, LGD is loss given default, and 
RR is the recovery rate given default. The formula intuitively shows that the product of the 
probability that you will not be paid back in full and what you risk to lose, equals the expected 
loss. By using the cumulative probability of default and dividing by years until maturity T the 
formula expresses expected default loss per year. 
In addition to the expected default loss given in the simple model above, in reality several 
other factors also affects the spread of bonds. Longstaff et al. (2005) examines the 
components of credit spreads, and finds that credit risk accounts for the majority of the 
spread, and that the relative size of this component grows as credit rating declines. This result 
is part of our motivation for focusing on the expected default loss, as credit risk is the major 
                                                          
2 A bond where the entire principal is paid at once at maturity date 
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component of bond spreads, and that our sample solely consists of high yield bonds. 
However, we will also examine other possible components of the credit spread, as explained 
in chapter 4.3. 
2.6 Credit ratings 
A credit rating is an assessment of the credit worthiness of a borrower or a specific issue of 
debt. The best known are the credit ratings done by dedicated rating companies like S&P and 
Moody´s. The ratings performed by banks are called “shadow ratings”. The rating firms are 
paid by the entity that is seeking rating either for itself or one of its debt issues. 
A rating is a relative measure of the riskiness of the borrower or issue. Hence, a AAA rating is 
not a guarantee against default, it only implies that it is less probable that the firm will default 
than another firm with lower rating. The same scale is used for all types of issuers, should it 
be a government, a municipality, or a firm.  As seen from table 2.2, the rating classifications 
used by different rating companies are very similar, even though they use different rating 
methodologies. A common factor is that the probability of default is a key factor for credit 
rating (Berk & DeMarzo, 2011). Bonds are divided into two main credit risk categories, 
investment grade (low risk) and high yield (high risk). Investment grade is defined as bonds 
with a credit rating of BBB- or higher, while high yield is bonds with credit rating BB+ or lower. 
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Table 2.2: Credit ratings 
 
Source: Håvik (2013) 
 
3 THE NORDIC CORPORATE BOND MARKET 
This chapter will briefly introduce the Nordic corporate High-Yield market, present descriptive 
statistics and general characteristics, discuss bond trading and transparency, and the role of 
Nordic Trustee. The main focus will be dedicated to the development of the Norwegian bond 
market as it is dominating in size, representing almost 70 percent of total issued volume in 
2014 (DNB, 2014). 
During the last decade, the Norwegian corporate bond market has transformed from a small 
national market dominated by domestic utilities into a global market with large issue volumes 
of high yield corporate bonds (Lind, 2014). The transformation has made the Oslo Stock 
Exchange and the Nordic Alternative Bond Market the world’s third largest market place for 
high yield corporate bonds. Along with the substantial growth of the Nordic HY market, a large 
number of international issuers and international investors have entered the market. The 
Risk class Moody´s S&P/Fitch Definition
Aaa AAA Best quality
Aa1 AA+
Aa2 AA
Aa3 AA-
A1 A+
A2 A
A3 A-
Baa1 BBB+
Baa2 BBB
Baa3 BBB-
Ba1 BB+
Ba2 BB
Ba3 BB-
B1 B+
B2 B
B3 B-
Caa1 … CCC+ … Default a likely option.
Ca-C CC-C
D D Default has occured.
INVESTMENT 
GRADE
Strong ability for timely payments.
Somewhat more exposed for negative
changes.
Adequate ability to meet payments. 
Some
elements of protection missing.
Speculative risk. Future not well secured.
Timely payment at the moment. Very
exposed to any negative changes.
SPECULATIVE 
GRADE / HIGH 
YIELD
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percent of bonds issued by foreign companies have increased from 10 percent in 2005 to 
almost 50 percent in 2014 (DNB, 2014). 
Figure 3.1 displays total issue and maturity volume in the period 2000 to 2014. The Norwegian 
High Yield market experienced significant growth prior to the financial crisis in 2008. The real 
economy was severely hit by the crash in the worldwide financial system. Equity and debt 
capital markets nearly froze overnight and banks were reluctant to offer capital and provide 
liquidity. The Nordic bond market was no exception and was significantly affected, declining 
from an all-time high issue volume of ~ NOK 80 billion in 2007 to less than a fifth of that in 
2008. In the following years, the Nordic bond market recovered in a high pace, reaching new 
all-time high levels in 2012 and 2014. The significant growth is due to several factors. The 
global monetary policy implemented to address the credit crisis has led government bond 
yields to historically low levels, and has forced institutional investors down the credit ladder 
in the search for yield. Furthermore, as a consequence of the financial crisis and the European 
sovereign debt crisis, institutional banks are under stricter regulation and face increased 
funding cost, which reduces the availability of bank financing. Consequently, the Nordic HY 
market has satisfied both bond issuers and investors, as bank lending deteriorated and the 
search for yield intensified. 
Figure 3.1: High yield bond issue and maturing volume (NOK billions) 
 
Source: Stamdata database 
0
20
40
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120
140
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020
HY issuance HY maturities
Total: 391 NOKbn
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Figure 3.1 illustrate significant refinancing needs in the years to come, and that a large part 
of the outstanding debt is exposed to the current low oil price. Over 40 percent of the Nordic 
bond market originates from oil and gas related issuers, and from the time of issue the oil 
price has declined from levels around $100 per barrel to below $60 per barrel. In the coming 
five years, from 2015 to 2020, a total of NOK 391 billion of outstanding debt matures. Two 
challenges lay ahead for bond issuers in the Nordic credit market. First to be able to pay the 
principal and then to find refinancing at acceptable terms. 
3.1 Corporate bond issuers 
Due to the nature of Norwegian business, the issuers in the Nordic corporate bond market 
have originated from capital intensive industries such as oil and gas, offshore, and shipping. 
In figure 3.2, we see that oil and gas related industries represented over 40 percent of the 
total outstanding amount in 2015. However, in the recent years also other industries, such as 
fishery, food and service industry, real estate, and other industries, have begun to use the 
bond market as a source of debt financing. 
Figure 3.2: Percentage bond issue volumes by industry (2000-2014) 
 
Source: Stamdata database 
 
Issuers have become increasingly diverse over the last decade. Today, issuers of all risk 
classes, newly established and matured firms, small and large caps, are represented in the 
market. 
Oil and gas services
33 %
Industry
19 %
Shipping
10 %
Real Estate
10 %
Oil and gas E&P
8 %
Transportation
4 %
Telecom/IT
3 %
Utilities
3 %
Seafood
2 %
Other
8 %
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3.2 Listing of bonds in Norway 
Today there exists two marketplaces for issuing debt in Norway, both offered by Oslo Børs; 
Nordic ABM and Oslo Børs. Nordic ABM is a more flexible offering, enabling companies to list 
debt in less than one week, with no need of approval from The Financial Supervisory Authority 
Norway and only on the basis of existing company information (Oslo Børs, 2015). According 
to the MIFID3 definitions, Nordic ABM is an unregulated marketplace and the issuer does not 
need to prepare their annual reports according to IFRS standards. Oslo Børs is considered a 
regulated marketplace by MIFID. A larger degree of transparency is demanded from the 
issuer, and the issuer must prepare an EEA-prospectus approved by The Financial Supervisory 
Authority Norway. 
3.3 Nordic Trustee and Stamdata 
Nordic Trustee, previously Norwegian Trustee, is the leading supplier of trustee services in 
the Nordics, and has been a central market player since its establishment 20 years ago. The 
trustee´s main services are to monitor that issuers complies with agreed bond covenants, 
makes their scheduled payments in time, and acts as a communication channel between the 
issuer and the bond holders. The trustee manages third-party contractual rights on the basis 
of individual assignments, and mainly offers these services to bond holders. The company 
itself was established as a collaboration between Norwegian banks in order to offer a neutral 
trustee service to the bond market, and is now primarily owned by Nordic banks, life 
insurance companies, and security brokers (Nordic Trustee, 2015). 
The use of a trustee can prove to be a major benefit both for issuers and bondholders. For 
the issuer, the trustee functions as single negotiation partner when discussing terms and 
issues with bond holders, and makes the process easier than having to approach each 
individual bond holder. It also makes it harder for single bond holders to steer negotiations 
to their own self-interest that violates the wishes of the majority. There exists no legal 
obligation for issuers to use a trustee, but the vast majority of firms in the market choose to 
do so. 
Stamdata is a subsidiary of Nordic Trustee, and is the leading provider of reference data for 
Nordic debt securities. They supply information on loan documents, the letters sent from the 
                                                          
3 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive of the EU 
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trustee to the bondholders, in addition to a detailed statistical database. The database covers 
Nordic debt securities, covering information on bonds, certificates, and structured debt 
securities. Nordic Trustee started Nordic Bond Pricing AS in 2013, who collects continuous 
prices of bonds. The service is currently not available, but should provide interesting research 
possibilities in the future.  
3.4 Bond trading 
The majority of corporate bonds are traded over-the-counter. This means that trades are 
done via a dealer network as opposed to a centralized exchange. In practice, a transaction is 
negotiated directly over computer networks, or by phone, with a broker-dealer. This is the 
reason why the corporate bond market is less transparent than the equity market, as price 
quotes and trade details are retained by the intermediary. 
3.5 Uniqueness of the Nordic corporate bond market 
The Nordic bond market has several characteristics that distinguishes it from its larger US and 
European international counterparts, and that makes it a convenient market to raise debt 
capital. First, the Nordic market has no public rating requirements from agencies such as 
Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, or Fitch. The practice is rather that the arranging banks’ credit 
research department publish a "shadow rating” based on international rating agency 
methodologies. 
Second, the documentation requirements are far looser and the timeline for a bond issue is 
far shorter than international standards. The documentation generally consist of a term sheet 
of  5 – 8 pages followed by a standard agreement  of 30 – 35 pages between the issuer and 
the trustee (Lind, 2014), resulting in a far simpler origination process than bonds issued under 
US or UK laws (Fitch Ratings, 2014). The timeline for a bond issue is normally less than five 
weeks for first time issuers and even shorter for frequent issuers. 
Finally, the transaction costs are lower compared to the UK and US (Lind, 2014). After the 
bond has been issued, listing is optional. 
The characteristics mentioned above have contributed to regional, and increasingly more 
international issuers and investors, preferring the emerging Nordic product over the 
cumbersome and costly international HY process (Fitch Ratings, 2014). 
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4 BOND PRICING THEORY 
We will here present literature, theory, and our model choices done to estimate bond 
spreads. We implement a credit pricing model using individual estimates of recovery rates in 
order to provide an estimate of bond spreads. We begin by reviewing literature and theory of 
credit pricing and follow with reviewing recovery rate prediction. 
4.1 Credit pricing 
There are today three main approaches to credit modelling and the pricing of credit risk. The 
first, and maybe best known, is based on Merton’s structural model (Merton, 1974). The 
second is the so called “reduced-form models”, with Jarrow et. al (1995) being one of the 
earliest examples. The third is purely statistical models like the SEBRA model used by Norges 
Bank (The Norwegian central bank) (Bernhardsen & Larsen, 2007) and Altman’s Z-score 
method (Altman E., 1968). 
The structural models are all based on a contingent-claims approach to valuing corporate debt 
using the option pricing theory proposed by Black & Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974). These 
are mainly used to estimate the spreads of bonds issued by public firms, as stock prices are a 
major component of the model input parameters, and the use of e.g. comparables would 
introduce new major sources of error. They are the models most used by practitioners today, 
with CreditMetrics and Moody´s KMV both using this methodology, and are favored for their 
economic intuition.  The reduced form method models a company’s time to default as a 
stochastic process whose price parameters are estimated by fitting the model to past bond 
price data. Hence, no assumption regarding the firm assets is made, and the dynamics of 
default is exogenously specified. The model’s main difference from the structural model is its 
assumption of a limited information set, in contrast to the comprehensive set assumed by 
structural models. It is assumed to be a more theoretically correct model due to this fact, but 
is limited by the need of detailed bond price data. Statistical models use various forms of 
econometric techniques to identify determinants of default. They are less reliant on economic 
theory as their model framework, but are limited by their poor out-of-sample-power. 
We have chosen to use a structural model based on the Merton (1974) model in our paper, 
and motivate this choice by the model’s economic intuitiveness, ease of interpretation, and 
our existing knowledge of the Black & Scholes and Merton framework. Furthermore, the 
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absence of sufficient high yield bond price data disables us from implementing a reduced form 
model, and a statistical approach would make it difficult to separate the effect of credit risk 
and other factors. We will thus focus on the structural models in the theory and literature 
review, but we will also provide a brief review of reduced form models and statistical models.  
4.1.1 Basic Merton model 
The basic Merton model uses the market value of equity of the firm, equity volatility, and the 
risk free rate to evaluate the assets and debt of a firm. The model builds upon the fact that 
debt and equity value can be replicated using options on the firm’s assets and uses option 
pricing to value the company’s debt under the no-arbitrage argument. We briefly present the 
intuition to why equity and debt can be replicated with options. 
Equity holders only have a claim on the company when the value of the firm is higher than 
the value of the debt. The value can be described as 𝐸𝑡 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥[0, 𝑉𝑡 − 𝐷], meaning that if 
the value of the firm exceeds the value of the debt at maturity, equity holders receive the 
residual claim. But if the firm value is below the debt value the equity is worthless. The value 
of an equity position is thus exactly the same as a call option on the firm’s assets with exercise 
price equal to the face value of debt (FV): 
 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝐹𝑉) (4.1) 
The same approach can be used to define the debt value using options on the firm’s assets. 
The payoff to debtholders at maturity can be defined as a portfolio of a risk free zero coupon 
bond with face value equal to the face value of outstanding debt and a short position in a put 
option on the firm’s assets with strike price equal to the face value of the outstanding debt at 
maturity: 
 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 − 𝑃𝑢𝑡 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝐹𝑉) (4.2)4 
If the firm’s asset value exceeds the required debt payment, the put is worthless, and 
debtholders receive the principle payment in full. If the firm’s assets is below the required 
payment, the owner of the put will exercise it. The debtholder will then receive the principle 
                                                          
4 See appendix 6C for a derivation of equation 4.2 
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of the risk-free bond minus the difference between the asset value and the principle, leaving 
the debtholder with only the assets of the firm. 
The payoff to debtholders at maturity is illustrated in figure 4.1 and gives an intuitive 
understanding that the replicating portfolio in equation 4.2 equals the debt value. 
Figure 4.1: Debt value as a of a risk free bond minus a put option on the firm's assets 
 
Source: Berk & DeMarzo (2011) 
A useful application of the above, besides valuing risky debt, is that it can be used to derive 
the probability of default. From (4.2) we see that the only case where the debt is not paid in 
full, i.e. default, is when the put option is exercised. In other words, the probability of default 
equals the probability that the put option is exercised. We will discuss this further when 
presenting the Black & Scholes option pricing model. 
The section above gave insight to how equity and debt can be valued using options on the 
firm’s assets, which will be useful to follow the presentation of the basic Merton model in the 
following. 
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In the basic Merton model, Merton uses the insight that the difference between a risk free 
bond and a risky bond is simply a put option5 on the underlying asset and applies a classic 
Black & Scholes model for valuation. The model assumes that the firm has issued one zero 
coupon bond, and that if the value of the firm’s assets 𝐴𝑡 falls below the default point B at 
the time of maturity T then the firm defaults. If not, then the firm pays their debt in full, and 
the remaining value of the equity is 𝐸𝑡 = max (𝐴𝑡 − 𝐷, 0).  
The model is based on several assumptions (Merton, 1974). 
1. There are no transactions costs, taxes or indivisibilities of assets 
2. There are a sufficient number of investors with comparable wealth levels such that 
each investor believes that he can buy and sell as much of an asset as he wants at 
the market price 
3. There exists an exchange market for borrowing and lending at the same rate of 
interest 
4. Short sales of all assets, with full use of the proceeds, are allowed 
5. Trading in assets take place continuously in time 
6. The Modigliani-Miller (MM) theorem that the value of the firm is invariant to its 
capital structure obtains. 
7. The term structure is flat and known with certainty; i.e., the price of a riskless 
discount bond that promises a payment of $1 at time T in the future is 𝑃(𝑡, 𝑇) =
𝑒−𝑟(𝑇 − 𝑡), where r is the (instantaneous) riskless rate of interest, the same for all 
time 
8. The dynamics for the value of the firm, V, through time can be described by a 
diffusion-type stochastic process. 
 
Merton (1974) notes that the first four assumptions, regarded as the perfect market 
assumptions, can be significantly weakened, as they are not necessary for the model to 
obtain. Assumption seven is made to focus on default risk rather than interest rate risk. 
Sundaresan (2013) discusses the assumptions and their use in evolving literature. Several 
strands of literature incorporate stochastic interest rates, which directly break assumption 7. 
                                                          
5 In practice a credit default swap (CDS) 
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Merton notes that this is a fairly harmless modification of his main insights. Sundaresan (2013) 
further notes that assumption 5 regarding continuously traded assets in time is used in 
practically all papers in the literature, and assumption 8 has been relaxed in some papers.  
The model assumes that the asset value, 𝐴𝑡, follows a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) 
 𝑑𝐴 = 𝜇𝐴 ∙ 𝐴 ∙ 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝐴 ∙ 𝐴 ∙ 𝑑𝑊 (4.7) 
Where 𝜇𝐴 is the expected continuously compounded return on A, 𝜎𝐴 is the volatility of asset 
returns and 𝑑𝑊 is the standard Wiener process, which is a continuous-time stochastic 
process, i.e. a random process. A Brownian motion assumes that there are two parts to a 
random movement. The first is a constant drift, illustrated by the first addend in equation 
above. The second is a random component, illustrated by the second addend in the equation. 
The movement of the asset is thus a result of a constant drift plus a random movement. 
Consequently, as the asset can increase or decrease at any random rate, the central limit 
theory in statistics tells us that the periodic return will be normally distributed, which is the 
foundation of the Black-Scholes-Merton model. Merton utilizes the Black & Scholes formula 
to calculate the value of equity as the value of a call on the firm’s underlying assets A with 
maturity at time T and exercise price equal to the debt value B. The value of equity is then 
given by the following formula: 
 𝐸 = 𝐴 𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝐵𝑒
−𝑟𝑇𝑁(𝑑2) 
 
(4.8) 
where 
𝑑1 =
ln (
𝐴
𝐵) + (𝑟 +
1
2𝜎𝐴
2)𝑇
𝜎𝐴√𝑇
 
𝑑2 = 𝑑1 − 𝜎𝐴√𝑇 
N(·) represents the cumulative normal distribution function. Here r is the continuously 
compounded risk free interest rate, 𝜎𝐴 is the asset volatility, and T is time to maturity. The 
formula above is the basic Black & Scholes formula for pricing a European call option. 
In simplified terms, equation (4.8) can be interpreted as what one would expect to receive 
minus what one would expect to pay from buying the call option. The variables 𝑑1 and 𝑑2 are 
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derived from the formula for calculating the standard Z-score, which is a statistical 
measurement used to derive probabilities from a normal probability distribution6. In fact, 
𝑁(𝑑2) is equal to N(-Z) from a normal probability distribution and is simply the probability 
that the asset value A will be at or above the debt value B at maturity. A direct result from the 
previous is that 𝑁(𝑑2) represents the probability that the option is exercised. 𝑁(𝑑1) is what 
is known as a conditional probability. When multiplied with the asset value, A𝑁(𝑑1) is the 
expected value of the firm if, and only if, the asset value is above the strike price at expiration. 
From these interpretations, the Black & Scholes formula can be described as the expected 
value of the assets, given that it’s above the debt value, minus the present value of what is to 
be paid multiplied with the probability of exercising. In other words, what one would expect 
to receive minus what one would expect to pay. 
Merton (1974) then utilize the Black & Scholes formula to value debt as a risk free bond minus 
a put option on the firms underlying assets A with maturity at time T and exercise price equal 
to the debt value B. The value of the put option, or risky debt is given by the following formula: 
𝐷 = 𝑃 = 𝐵𝑒−𝑟𝑇 𝑁(−𝑑2) − 𝐴 𝑁(−𝑑1) 
𝐴𝑁(−𝑑1) is now the expected value of the assets if, and only if, the value is below the strike 
price at expiration. 𝑁(−𝑑2) is the probability that the asset value is below the strike price at 
expiration and consequently also the probability of the put option to be exercised, which we  
earlier found to be the same as the probability of default when valuing debt using options in 
the theory section. 
4.1.2 KMV extension of the Merton model 
In their paper, Crosbie & Bohn (2003) gives the reader insight into the KMV model, which 
enables an intuitive explanation of the transition from the Merton model to estimates of 
credit spreads. With the estimate of probability of default, it is easy to see the transition from 
the Merton model to an estimate of credit spread by multiplying probability of default with 
the recovery rate, and adjusting for maturity. They use the credit risk measure distance to 
default and defines it as the number of asset standard deviation moves the asset value must 
make in order for a firm to default. Crosbie & Bohn (2003) explains how distance to default 
can be estimated through the observed values of stock prices, long term and short term debt, 
                                                          
6 See appendix 6A for a presentation of the normal probability distribution and Z-scores 
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the risk free rate through government treasury rates, and time to maturity T. They estimate 
the asset value A, asset volatility 𝜎𝐴, expected asset return 𝜇𝐴, and default barrier B, and use 
the estimates7 to calculate distance to default (DD) as follows 
𝐷𝐷 =
ln (
𝐴
𝐵) + (𝜇𝐴 −
1
2𝜎𝐴
2) 𝑇
𝜎𝐴√𝑇
 
The expression shows the change in continuously compounded returns measured in standard 
deviations, which needs to change in order for the firm to reach default. Thus, ln (
𝐴
𝐵
) can be 
interpreted as the return the firm can afford to lose, and (𝜇𝐴 −
1
2
𝜎𝐴
2)𝑇 can be interpreted as 
the return the firm is expected to earn before the debt matures. The sum of the two 
expressions is therefore the maximal negative change in returns possible without reaching 
default. Again, this is measured in terms of standard deviations. If we assume that DD is 
normally distributed, i.e. that the asset value follows a geometric Brownian motion, the 
probability of default can then be calculated using the normal probability distribution8: 
𝑃𝐷 = 𝑁(−𝐷𝐷) 
Moody´s KMV has created their own distribution based on historical defaults. This distribution 
is created by matching a certain company’s DD with other companies with the same DD and 
time to maturity, and observe how many defaulted.  This makes it possible to create a default 
frequency distribution. With this approach, the model is independent of any theoretical 
assumption of probability distribution. However, a problem does arise when assuming that 
historical defaults has predictive power, which has been a major point of criticism of structural 
models. Critics are skeptical of using past events as predictions of the future, and instead 
promote the use of forward looking variables such as prices. However, Moody´s KMV has 
shown that their model has good predictive power (Crossen & Zhang, 2011).  
Crosbie & Bohn (2003) illustrate how their measure EDF is estimated. EDF, or estimated 
default frequency, may be defined as the probability of default within 1 year and is calculated 
                                                          
7 How asset value, asset volatility, expected asset return, and default barrier are estimated is 
explained in the methodology section 
8 As explained in appendix 6A 
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using the method described above. The figure 4.2 explains how EDF is calculated using 6 input 
variables: 
1. The current asset value 
2. The distribution of the asset value at time H 
3. The volatility of the future asset value at time H 
4. The level of the default point, determined by the book value of total liabilities 
5. The expected rate of growth in the asset value over the horizon 
6. The length of the horizon, H 
Figure 4.2: Illustration of distance to default and probability of default 
The figure visualizes the intuition behind their model, with asset value at time 0 (1) growing 
at an expected rate (5) with a certain degree of volatility (3). If the asset value falls below the 
default barrier (4), here assumed to be the book value of liabilities, the firm defaults at time 
H (6). Given a distribution (2) around the expected value of assets, the probability of default 
can intuitively be calculated as N(-DD) given the normal distribution, visualized as the shaded 
area under the graph.  
4.1.3 Adaptations of the Merton model 
The Merton (1974) model spawned a large amount of theoretical literature on risky debt 
pricing. In this section, we will review some of the extensions and adaptions of structural 
models done in the literature. According to Eom et al. (2004), one motivating factor of the 
large amount of literature is the perception that the Merton model cannot predict sufficiently 
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high spreads to match those observed in the market. The resulting papers have included 
various extensions and improvements in order to correct for this underpricing. Examples 
include allowing for coupon payments (Eom et al. (2004), Black & Cox (1976), Bielecki & 
Rutkowski (2002)), stochastic interest rates (Longstaff & Schwartz (1995)), allowing default 
prior to maturity (Gekse (1977), Jarrow & Protter (2004)), including the effect of covenants 
(Black & Cox (1976)), taking account of taxes and bankruptcy costs (Leland (1994)), and 
implementing a stationary leverage ratio (Collin-Dufresne et al (2001)). However, even with 
extensions, most of the models still underestimates spreads.  
There has been developed several adaptations of the Merton model in recent times, and 
hence several multi-model analysis´ have been performed in order to measure the accuracy 
of the new models. Eom et. al (2004) is one such study. They tested the accuracy of 5 models; 
an extended version of the Merton (1974) model allowing for coupons through the modelling 
of the bond as a portfolio of ZCB, in addition to the models of Geske (1977), Leland & Toft 
(1996), Longstaff & Schwartz (1995), and Collin-Dufresne et al (2001). 
They found that all models tested have bias issues, over predicting spreads for high yield 
bonds and underestimating spreads for safer, investment grade bonds. The Merton (1974) 
and Geske (1977) models both tend to underestimate spreads on average, while on the other 
hand, Leland & Toft (1996) overestimates spreads. 
We try to minimize the problem of underestimation by implementing an extended version of 
the Merton model, as described by Eom et al (2004). This model incorporates coupons, 
payout ratio9, and default before maturity. This is done by valuing a bond as a portfolio of 
zero coupon bonds, thus incorporating coupons and default before maturity at once. Payout 
ratio is included to incorporate the cash outflow to bond and equity holders. This eliminates 
some of the simplifying assumptions in the simple model, and should in theory produce more 
accurate estimates. More details on the model are shown in the methodology section. Given 
that the previous literature shows that most structural models under predict spreads even 
with the extensions mentioned, we try to give insight into what this difference consists of 
                                                          
9 Defined as the sum of dividends to equity holders, share repurchases adjusted for stock splits, and 
interest paid to equity and bond holders, divided by asset value 
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through a regression analysis of the mispricing, thus enabling us to use a model that in the 
base case underestimates spreads.  
4.1.4 Reduced form models 
Another major strand of credit risk modelling research focuses on reduced form models of 
default. One of the earliest examples of reduced form models are first found in a 1995 paper 
written by Jarrow & Turnbull (1995). The reduced form models’ flexibility in their functional 
form is one of the main traits differentiating the model from structural models. Their flexible 
form entails that it is easy to fit a narrow collection of credit spreads. You are left with a model 
with strong predictive power within the sample, but low predictive power outside the sample. 
This is in strong contrast to structural models, which functional form is static (Arora, R. Bohn, 
& Zhu, 2005). The method models a company’s time to default as a stochastic process with 
price parameters estimated by fitting the model to past bond price data. This contrasts with 
the structural models, where no assumption regarding firm assets is made and the dynamics 
of default is exogenously specified.  
Jarrow et al (2004) compares structural and reduced form models, and highlights their 
differences. They point out that structural models assumes complete information about a 
very detailed information set, thus assuming that a firm’s default time is predictable. In 
contrast, reduced form models assume knowledge of a less detailed information set, more 
like what is actually observable in the market place. This information assumption implies that 
the firms default time is inaccessible. This is the main part of the discussion and conflict 
between researchers favoring one or the other model. Followers of reduced form models 
argue that their information assumption is more realistic, and should be used because it is 
the same information set used by the market (Jarrow & Protter, 2004). On the other hand, 
users of structural models (Arora, R. Bohn, & Zhu, 2005) argue that the complete information 
assumption of structural models is an approximation designed to facilitate a simpler way of 
capturing the various economic nuances of how a firm operates.  
There has been an increase in research regarding reduced form models in recent times, 
motivated by the fact that the framework utilizes bond prices as input. Comprehensive 
information regarding bond prices has been, and still is to a certain degree, hard to obtain. 
Nevertheless, as information access is improved, we might see an increase in popularity of 
these models. 
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4.1.5 Statistical models 
A third strand of literature is based on using econometric techniques to find determinants of 
default and with them create a model for predicting default. One such model is the SEBRA 
model of Norges Bank (Bernhardsen & Larsen, 2007). This model uses key figures calculated 
on the basis of firms’ annual reports, in addition to data on the firms’ age, size, and industry. 
The model has been revised and improved over the years by researchers at Norges Bank, and 
is mainly used to estimate the vulnerability of the banking sector.  
A better-known model is the so-called Z-score model developed by Altman (1968). He 
performed multiple discriminant analysis as a tool to predict bankruptcy, which is an 
econometric technique used to categorize an observation into several predetermined 
categories. He used a sample of 33 companies that went bankrupt during the years 1946-
1965 and paired them with 33 companies of the same industry and size. He collected financial 
data from the year previous to the year of default, and collected in total 22 various variables, 
out of which 5 were deemed significant in predicting corporate default. The variables were; 
earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets, working capital divided by total 
assets, market value of equity divided by book value of total debt, retained earnings divided 
by total assets, and the ratio of sales divided by total assets. Altman continued his research, 
and developed a new model in 1977 (Altman, Haldeman, & Narayanan, 1977), using the same 
methodology, but now with a larger sample.  
Statistical models has been popular as they are less reliant on specific assumptions about the 
dynamics of default, but are limited by their poor out-of-sample-power. This means that the  
coefficients estimated by Altman using American data is not universally applicable to all 
markets and industries. 
4.1.6 Our model choice 
In this paper, our focus is on the structural models of default and we have chosen to apply an 
extended version of the Merton model. This model does not need two of the simplifying 
assumptions of the simple model; no coupons and that default only can happen at maturity. 
These two assumptions are taken into account by modelling coupon bonds as a portfolio of 
zero coupon bonds, and through this improvement, we reduce some of the bias of the simple 
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model. In addition, the model implements the simple modification of adding payout ratio10 
as part of the drift term of assets. We further motivate the choice of this model with its 
economic intuitiveness, ease of interpretation, and our existing knowledge of the Black & 
Scholes and Merton framework. How we implement this model is described further in chapter 
6.1.1. 
4.2 Predicting recovery rates 
The previous section gave a thorough presentation of the theory behind our model 
framework that will be used to price the bonds in our sample. An important factor in the 
model is the recovery rate in the case of default. Hence, precise estimates of recovery rates 
would strengthen the model’s accuracy in predicting spreads. In 6.2 we perform an individual 
analysis of recovery rates in attempt to attain individual recovery rate estimates. In this 
section, we will review theory and literature regarding modelling of recovery rates to 
motivate our recovery rate analysis. 
There are generally two types of literature on recovery rates: (i) Theoretical papers on credit 
risk models that makes various assumption about recovery rates, and (ii) empirical papers 
that studies historical recovery rates on defaulted bonds. 
Theoretical papers on recovery rates are, for obvious reasons, closely linked to the various 
credit risk theories presented earlier in this paper. Creating a credit risk model without making 
explicit or implicit assumptions regarding the recovery rate is inevitable. Second generation 
structural models, which is what is used in this paper, treat the recovery rate as an exogenous 
variable. The recovery rate is thus independent from the probability of default and needs to 
be estimated separately. This is partly the motivation for performing a complete analysis on 
recovery rates before running the credit model. 
Empirical papers on recovery rates are generally data intensive studies attempting to identify 
driving factors of recovery rates using various statistical methods. For instance, Altman and 
Kishore (1996) analyze recovery rates with respect to industry, and find that public utilities, 
chemical, and petroleum companies has the highest average recoveries. Furthermore, they 
find that bond rating has almost no effect when adjusting for seniority, which is the same 
                                                          
10 Payout ratio is defined as the sum of dividends, share repurchases, and interest paid to debt and 
equity holders. 
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conclusion of a similar study by Hanson & Schuermann (2004). Other studies have found that 
recovery rates and default rates are negatively related (Altman, Brady, Resti, & Sironi, 2005). 
On the other hand, one may find researchers who argue that there is no need to 
systematically model recovery rates. The argument is that the recovery rate is the outcome 
of a bargaining process between the creditor and the debtor, which is assumed to be 
unsystematic (Longstaff & Schwartz, 1995). 
The recovery rate analysis in section 6.2 will test several of the driving factors found in earlier 
research. The results will form an independent view of which factors that are applicable for 
the Nordic market.  
4.3 Credit risk premium 
The previous sections gave a thorough insight in relevant theories for predicting expected loss 
(EL) through the two factors Probability of default (PD) and Loss given default (LGD). While 
the typical textbook assumption is that default risk is the only inherent risk investors are 
compensated for, several researchers and practitioners claim that it is only one of several 
sources, and that default risk alone is not sufficient to explain the full spread observed in the 
market. (See for instance Hull, Predescu, & White (2012), and Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, & Mann 
(2001)).  
The unexplained part of the credit spread, when relying solely on expected default risk, is 
often referred to as the credit spread puzzle and has received a lot of attention among 
researchers in later time11. A recent study by Sæbø (2014), find that a credit puzzle is highly 
present in the Norwegian fixed income market, but state that the word puzzle is misleading 
as it implyes that investors are risk neutral. In other words, if the average investor are willing 
to accept credit spreads equal to the expected loss, the expected return is equal to an 
otherwise similar risk free bond. This means that the investor does not demand a premium 
for the uncertainty inherent in the expected loss; hence the investor is risk neutral. Based on 
the more realistic assumption that most investors are risk averse, Sæbø (2014) conclude that 
there should be a credit puzzle, i.e. a compansation for risk aversion. In line with other well 
known research (Hull et al. (2012), and Elton et al. (2001)), he also conclude that part of the 
puzzle may be explained by compensation for bearing non-default related risk factors. The 
                                                          
11 See for instance Feldhütter & Schaefer (2014), and Sæbø (2014) 
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most common factors examined by researchers are tax premium, liquidity premium and risk 
premium. 
Tax premium originates mostly from studies on the US market, as interests on corporate- and 
government bonds are taxed differently in the US. In the Nordic market, on the other hand, 
interests on corporate- and government bonds are taxed equally, and the tax effect will hence 
not be an issue in credit spreads in the Nordic market, or in this paper. 
Liquidity premium stems from the fact that part of the corporate bond market suffer from 
low trading volumes, which leads to higher and more volatile bid ask spreads. The result may 
be delays in finding a counterparty for a transaction and lower realized price in the case of a 
sale, and investors demand compensation for these risks. 
Another source of premium is migration risk, which may be defined as the risk that the credit 
quality of the issuer deteriorates. For bonds, this implies the risk that the credit quality of the 
issuer deteriorates within the lifetime of the bond. Migration risk and the incremental loss for 
each fall in credit rating can be understood much in the same way as probability of default 
and recovery rates earlier described. Migration risk can be shown as a the product of the 
probability that the rating falls within a set time period multiplied by the expected loss for the 
investor from the incremental change in rating. The Merton (1974) model does not 
incorporate this risk, and hence it might be one of the factors explaining the difference 
between estimated model spreads and actual observed spreads 
Risk premium stems from the bond’s sensitivity to systematic risk factors and there are 
several reasons to why a risk premium exist. First, bonds often do not default independently. 
In fact, it can be shown that defaults tend to cluster in time which implies that there is a non-
diversifiable risk that investor should demand compensation for bearing. (Hull, Predescu, & 
White, 2012). Second, the lower the quality of the bond, the more it becomes like equity. 
Theoretically, when the asset value is below the debt value, debtholders have a full claim in 
the company and the debt converts to equity. As the debt become more like equity, the bond 
price will be more affected by the same market factors as the equity and should be 
compensated by the same non-diversifiable risks as equity investors do. 
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5 DATA 
This chapter will first present the various sources of data on bond issues, recovery rates, 
financial and market data, and discuss assumptions and methods used to define the final 
sample. We then present descriptive statistics of the bond sample and recovery rates. 
5.1 The high yield sample 
The data used to define the Nordic High-Yield market in this thesis was retrieved from the 
Stamdata database. Stamdata is a subsidiary of Nordic Trustee and is the leading provider of 
debt securities data in the Nordic market, with coverage of almost all bond issues in the 
market place. Bond characteristics in the database are only given for the time of issue. The 
analysis is therefore limited to observed spreads at issue. We assume that the bond is issued 
at par, and hence that credit spread can be derived from the coupon rate.    
When analyzing credit spreads, it is important to use a relatively homogenous bond sample 
to avoid biased results. For instance, the spread for a convertible bond will on average be 
lower than an otherwise similar bond, as part of the compensation is paid with an embedded 
call option on the company. Hence, the same model would not be valid to analyze and 
compare spreads for the two types of bonds. This is the reason why we filter the bond dataset 
from initially over 23,500 to 323 bonds. The following section will motivate the high number 
of exclusions from the preliminary sample. 
5.1.1 Determining the high-yield sample 
First, issue-based statistics for the entire Nordic bond market were extracted from the 
Stamdata database, which comprises over 23,000 investment grade and high-yield bond 
issues from 1950 to 2015 with an aggregate issued amount of 16,176 NOK bn. The data 
include close to all corporate bonds issued in the Nordics, but has lower coverage of 
government bonds, where only Norwegian government bonds are covered until the mid 
2000s. 
Table 5.1 presents a summary of the preliminary sample sorted by industry. The majority of 
the issuers are government entities, finance institutions, and banks. 
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Table 5.1: Overview preliminary sample 
 
Source: Stamdata database 
Table 5.2: Percentage share of Investment grade vs High Yield 
 
Source: Stamdata database 
Table 5.1 presents the breakdown of high yield and investment grade bonds in the preliminary 
sample. Total issued volume of investment grade bonds and corporate high yield bonds in the 
period was 16,179 and 848 NOK billion respectively, illustrating that the high yield market is 
a minor part of the overall bond market. However, the focus in this thesis is on high-yield, 
rather than investment grade bonds. All 21,511 investment grade issues were therefore 
excluded from the final sample. 
 
Issued amount (NOKbn) # of issues % of issues
High Yield 848                                                 2,004                           9 %
Investment Grade 15,328                                           21,511                        91 %
Total 16,176                                           23,515                        23,515                             
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As illustrated in figure 5.1, the Nordic high yield bond market did not really emerge before 
the beginning of the new millennium. Limited number of issues before this time makes the 
data unsuitable for statistical analysis. For this reason, in addition to poor visibility of default 
and recovery data, all issues before the year 2000 were left out from the final HY sample. 
Figure 5.1: Nordic high yield issues 
 
Source: Stamdata database 
 
The analysis in chapter 7 is highly data intensive and requires data from several different 
financial markets, as well as financial data. The data gathering process was thus time 
consuming.  
The initial focus in our thesis was planned to be on the difference in credit spreads for 
defaulted bonds and non-defaulted. Such an analysis would not need issues in the recent 
years, as we would not have the grounds to distinguish between defaulted and non-defaulted 
bonds before they are realized. We therefore used a great amount of time to collect a 
complete dataset on all relevant bonds issued before 12/12/12. Later in the process, we 
decided to extend the scope of the paper to analyze other explanatory factors than default. 
However, we did not have the time nor the capacity to collect data on the remaining high 
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yield bonds and the final high yield sample thus only include bonds issued before the end of 
2012. 
In order to define the final high yield sample, other criteria were also used to filter out certain 
bond issues to achieve a more homogenous dataset. Bonds issued by banks, finance 
institutions, and companies that was state owned were excluded. Convertibles, linked and 
credit linked notes, capital content securities, and warrants were also excluded from the 
sample. As will be described in detail later, our credit model require market data, such as 
market cap and volatility, which is only available for publicly listed firms. We therefore only 
include bonds issued by public companies to reach the final bonds sample in our analysis. We 
present a full overview of the number of bonds excluded per criteria are in appendix 2. 
5.1.2 Describing the High yield Sample 
To sum up, the final high yield sample (hereafter called HY sample) consist of plain vanilla 
bonds issued by public non-financial companies that are not state owned in the timeframe 
2000-2012. The HY sample comprises of 323 bond issues, amounting to 188 NOK billion in 
total issued volume. 
Table 5.3 summarizes the sample divided by industry. The oil and gas constitute by far the 
largest issuer group, followed by pulp, paper and forestry, industry, shipping, telecom/IT, 
seafood, real estate and transportation. These are broad industry classifications. For instance, 
“Oil and gas” include E&P, drilling, floatels, FPSO, service, supply, subsea and surveying 
companies. 
Table 5.3: Final HY sample overview 
 
Source: Stamdata database 
Industry Issued volume (NOKm) % Average issue size N
Oil and gas 88,101                                     47 % 518                                      170
Pulp, paper and forestry 28,377                                     15 % 2,027                                   14
Industry 22,022                                     12 % 512                                      43
Shipping 17,533                                     9 % 474                                      37
Telecom/IT 14,228                                     8 % 949                                      15
Seafood 5,850                                        3 % 390                                      15
Real Estate 3,991                                        2 % 307                                      13
Transportation 2,051                                        1 % 410                                      5
Other 6,817                                        4 % 620                                      11
Total 188,971                                   100 % 585 323
37 
 
Table 5.4 below presents the distribution of fixed vs floating coupon rates in the sample.12 64 
percent of the 323 bonds in the final sample have floating coupon rates, where the reference 
rate is usually set to the interbank rate of the respective currency’s home country. The 
remaining 36 percent have fixed coupon rates. The distribution is more even when measured 
in issued volume, where floating rate bonds account for 54 percent of the issued volume. 
Table 5.4: Fixed vs Floating coupon rates7 
 
Source: Stamdata database 
The coupon spread above risk free rate varies from close to zero to 14 percentage points 
within the sample (Figure 5.2). While spreads for floating rate bonds are given directly as the 
spread above a reference rate, spreads for fixed coupon bonds needed to be calculated. A 
more detailed discussion of spread calculations are presented later in the paper, but in short, 
the spread is calculated by subtracting the rate of government bonds with matching currency 
and duration. The full distribution of coupon spreads are summarized below in a histogram 
with # of shares on the y-axis and spread intervals on the x-axis. The average spread within 
the sample is 5.2 percentage points, and the distribution is centralized around this area 
(Figure 5.3) 
Figure 5.2: Coupon spread histogram (Bins in percent) 
 
                                                          
12 The sample also includes two zero-coupon bonds and are left out of table 5.4 
Coupon type Avg. coupon Std   Avg. spread Std   % of value % of N N 
Fixed 9.1 % 3.1 % 6.2 % 3.2 % 46 % 36 % 115
Floating 6.9 % 2.6 % 4.6 % 2.4 % 54 % 64 % 206
Total 7.7 % 7.7 % 5.2 % 2.9 % 100 % 100 % 321
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Source: Stamdata database 
The typical maturity in the sample is around 5 years, and the utmost bonds have a maturity 
of less than seven years (Figure 5.3). A complete list of the bond sample is presented in 
appendix_1. 
Figure 5.3: Maturity histogram 
 
Source: Stamdata database 
 
5.2 Default and recovery rate data 
To date, there are no official statistics on default and recovery rates in the Nordic market. 
This is due to both the bond market’s generally low transparency and the complicated process 
of calculating precise recovery rates. Former master theses written by business students, 
have attempted to find and analyze default and recovery rates (Haugland & Brekke (2010), 
Grøstad (2013)), but comparison of descriptive statistics show significant deviations in their 
estimated recovery and default rates, as well as with ours. It is important to note that this is 
most likely due to the numerous ways of defining and calculating default and recovery rates, 
and not poor research. It is therefore important to assess default data with a critical view and 
be well aware of which methods, definitions, and assumptions used in the underlying 
material. 
Nordic Trustee is daily monitoring the majority of bonds in the Nordic market, and have an 
especially active role in cases of default. Hence, they possess the greatest amount of key 
information about default history and payments to bondholders in the market. Stamdata has 
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therefore now created a proprietary dataset on ultimate recovery rates, which is intended to 
be released in the Stamdata database at a later stage, covering defaults from 2007 to 2015. 
The dataset is a preliminary version, but is arguably still the most comprehensive and precise 
dataset on recovery rates in the Nordic market created to date, and this study will be the first 
to utilize it in an academic paper. 
5.2.1 Definition of default events in the sample 
By assuming a “buy and hold” strategy throughout the analysis, we also assume a yearly yield 
equal to the annualized coupon yield, unless the bond defaults. Defining and identifying 
defaulted bonds is therefore critical for the ex-post analysis of bond performance, and hence, 
bond pricing. The underlying definition of defaults in the dataset will be presented in the 
following. 
Initially, Stamdata identify defaults according to the following definition: “An issuer is by 
definition in default when it is in breach of the legal obligations between issuer and 
bondholders as set out in the bond indenture” (Nordic Trustee, 2014). Stamdata further 
define defaults in the following three categories: Restructured, liquidated and non-payments. 
Figure 5.4: Nordic trustee default event classification 
 
 
 
A Restructuring is a process that allows the issuer to reduce and renegotiate its debt 
obligations. The result is often significant updates of the bond indentures, in order to restore 
liquidity and the ability to continue its operations to avoid bankruptcy. Liquidation is when 
the firm’s assets are sold, and the proceeds are paid to creditors (bondholders) after a 
bankruptcy. Any leftovers will be distributed to shareholders. A non-payment is when the 
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issuer is unable to make coupon payments or installments. Defaults where the issuer is in 
breech with covenants, so-called technical defaults, are not included in the dataset. As 
illustrated in Figure 5.5, restructurings are further defined as “Distressed exchanges” and 
“Renegotiated terms”. The former is a restructuring where the bond’s outstanding amount is 
exchanged for new securities with lower priority, e.g. options, debt for equity swaps, new 
debt, and PIK bonds. Renegotiated terms is when the issuer is allowed to renegotiate bond-
terms, such as maturity profile, bond priority, and security with the intention of preventing 
immediate distress. Defaults classified as “Restructured: Renegotiated terms” are not 
included in the recovery rate dataset. Stamdata argue that including these defaults will 
deteriorate the quality of the results when calculating recovery rates in a bond market (Nordic 
Trustee, 2014). For instance, bonds with renegotiated longer maturities or with lower priority 
will have the same payout as promised at issue, even though increased duration and riskiness 
could lead to notable disadvantages at a later stage. Renegotiated lower coupons are, 
however, more debatable. Lower coupon rates will result in a lower cash flow to bondholders 
than promised and will therefore have a theoretically recovery rate of less than 100 percent. 
However, based on observed market prices the changes are often less than significant 
(Solberg, 2015), and including renegotiated terms defaults in the recovery dataset would only 
bias the estimates upwards. Another argument for exclusion is that renegotiated terms is 
often the first step towards a distressed exchange, or even worse, a liquidation. Including 
these defaults would thus lead to repetitive observations of the same bond default. In the 
following analyses, we therefore ignore renegotiated terms restructurings, and assume that 
these bonds pay investors as promised at issue, unless a more severe credit event occurs. 
5.2.2 Describing the recovery rate dataset 
The recovery rate dataset consists of 150 defaults in the time span from 2007 to 2014. Table 
5.5 presents the distribution among liquidated, Restructured (distressed exchange), and non-
payments. 
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Table 5.5: Breakdown of credit events 
 
Source: Stamdata recovery rate database 
With the exception of 2007 and 2008, the distribution between the different types of defaults 
have remained relatively similar each year. The majority of defaults result in restructurings, 
in the form of distressed exchanges as defined above. Figure 5.5 and 5.6 below present the 
number of defaults and defaulted volume respectively from 2007 to 2014. 
Figure 5.5: Number of defaults in the period 2007-2014 
 
Distressed Exchange Liquidation Non-payment Total
Bonds 62 36 11 109
CDs 1 2 1 4
Convertibles 21 6 10 37
Total 84 44 22 150
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Figure 5.6: Defaulted volume (NOKm)  
 
Source: Stamdata recovery rate database 
The financial crisis in 2008 clearly impacted the high-yield bond market, leading to a high 
number of defaults in 2008 and 2009. The number of defaults has remained fairly stable at 
lower levels the continuing years. However, when measured in defaulted volumes, figure 5.6 
show more variation in the aftermath of the crisis. 
Table 5.6 shows recovery statistics divided in seniority within the capital structure and 
whether the bonds are secured or not. Subordinate bonds, as expected, experienced a 
notably lower of average recovery rate than the secured bonds. Surprisingly, senior 
unsecured bonds have experienced slightly higher recovery than senior secured, with an 
average recovery of 47% and 44% respectively, which is not in line with what one would 
expect. However, this is may be explained the fact that the majority of oil service bonds in the 
sample are senior secured and experienced much lower recovery rates than the E&P sector, 
where the majority of bonds were unsecured. 
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Table 5.6: Breakdown of recovery rated by seniority 
 
Source: Stamdata recovery rate database 
 
Table 5.7 and 5.8 presents evidence in favor of this explanation for higher average recovery 
for unsecured than secured bonds. The two tables show the number of defaults and the value 
weighted average recovery rate respectively, distributed in the two largest sectors and by 
security/seniority. The two largest sectors in the default sample are E&P and Oil services, 
which together account for two thirds of the defaulted bonds. We see that 49 out of the 73 
bonds issued in the Oil service sector are secured, whereas within the E&P sector the majority 
is unsecured, though more evenly distributed. As the value weighted average recovery rate 
within oil service is significantly lower than within E&P, the average rates for the overall 
sample indicate that secured bonds recover less than unsecured, but the reason is more likely 
to be that the companies with secured bonds had lower expected recovery independent of 
security. In fact, when we look at the difference between secured and unsecured within the 
two sectors, the value weighted average recovery is higher for the secured bonds. For the 
industries defined as “other”, the result is still counter-intuitive. The explanation is likely due 
similar to the previous, but the industry dispersion is too high to perform the same analysis.  
Volume weighted Average Median N
Senior Secured 43 % 44 % 39 % 83
Senior Unsecured 47 % 49 % 48 % 52
Subordinated 5 % 16 % 0 % 15
All bonds 42 % 42 % 35 % 150
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Table 5.7: Breakdown of credit events on industry and seniority 
 
Table 5.8: Breakdown of Value weighted average recovery rates on Industry and Seniority 
Source: Stamdata recovery rate database 
Figure 5.7 below illustrate that the recovery rates fluctuates widely around its mean. The 
sample has a clearly non-normal distribution, which makes average a less informative 
measure to describe the sample and will cause challenges for statistical analyses. The 
distribution can appear to be approximately a bimodal distribution, meaning that 
bondholders are likely to recover either close to nothing, or close to everything. 
Figure 5.7: Recovery rate distribution 
 
Source: Stamdata recovery rate database 
Average recovery rates have varied between 40 and 60 percent after 2009 and well above 
levels during the financial crisis in 2007-2008. The extremely low recovery rate in 2007 should 
Industry Senior Secured Senior Unsecured Subordinated Total
E&P 12                               15                               27                               
Oil Services 49                               17                               7                                 73                               
Other 23                               20                               7                                 50                               
Total 84                               52                               14                               150                             
Industry Senior Secured Senior Unsecured Subordinated Total
E&P 64 % 61 % 62 %
Oil Services 47 % 42 % 7 % 43 %
Other 20 % 44 % 1 % 27 %
Total 43 % 47 % 5 % 42 %
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be interpreted with care due to the low number of observations, nevertheless, recovery rates 
in the Nordic market has improved notably in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Figure 5.8 
below shows the number of defaulted issuers and the average ultimate recovery of the value 
weighted recovery of the issuers’ defaulted bonds per year. 
Figure 5.8: Average Recovery rate development 
 
Source: Stamdata recovery rate database 
 
5.3 Financial and market data gathering 
This section explains where we have gathered the financial and market data for our dataset. 
We have naturally found that company observations are in various currencies, and so we 
make sure that all observations are converted to NOK for variables listed in absolute terms, 
while variables listed in ratios, we make sure that all variable observations is in the same 
currency within the same company. 
5.3.1 Financial data 
We have gathered financial data from a variety of sources in order to obtain a comprehensive 
set of input variables for our models. 
We have mainly used The Norwegian Corporate Accounts database issued by The Norwegian 
School of Economics and their subsidiary SNF. The database contains corporate and financial 
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information for all Norwegian companies for the years 1992-2011. Documentation, 
description, and quality assurance can be reviewed in a paper by Berner et al (2013). 
For observations of all public and available private Norwegian companies in 2012, we have 
extracted data manually from the website www.forvalt.no, which is a searchable engine that 
gathers corporate information from a variety of sources. For further information regarding 
the sources used by www.forvalt.no, please visit (forvalt.no, 2015). 
For non-Norwegian companies without data in The Norwegian Corporate Accounts database 
or forvalt, we have gathered information from Bloomberg, Orbis, and directly from annual 
reports. 
For data on payout ratio (dividend, share repurchases etc.) and volume traded data has been 
collected from Compustat. 
5.3.2 Market data 
Market data cover stock price quotes and total shares outstanding. A significant share of the 
market data in our dataset has been gathered from Børs Databasen (NHH, 2015), a part of 
Børsprosjektet at NHH, which is a database containing detailed market data on Norwegian 
firms, available for students and faculty members. 
Non-Norwegian firms and firms not found in Børsdatabasen has been found in yahoo finance 
and Bloomberg, in addition to some observation of companies listed on Nasdaq OMX Nordic, 
which has been extracted directly from their website www.nasdaqomxnordic.com. For these 
observations, shares outstanding have been extracted directly from company annual reports. 
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6 METHODOLOGY 
In this section, we will elaborate on our method used to calculate credit spreads. To do the 
estimation, we combine a credit model based on the extended Merton model described by 
Eom et al (2004) with individual estimation of loss given default, to estimate the spread of 
individual bonds. We begin by describing the credit model in section 6.1, continue with a 
thorough review of parameter estimation in 6.2, and finally describe in 6.3 how we try to 
estimate recovery rates.  
6.1 Method of estimating spread 
In the extended model we follow the same procedures as Eom et al (2004), who utilizes the 
Merton model and models a coupon paying bond as a portfolio of zero coupon bonds. They 
also do the simple modification of including payout ratio, defined as dividends, share 
repurchases, and interest paid to equity and bondholders. This reduces the drift of the assets 
in the standard Merton model, and so increases the chance of default and predicted spreads. 
The model uses both variables directly observable in the market place, in addition to 
unobservable variables that must be estimated. These include asset value, asset volatility, and 
default barrier. How they are estimated is described in section 6.2. Observed variables used 
as input includes bond coupon, firm equity price quotes, book value of liabilities, government 
treasury rates, time to maturity, dividend payout rate, share repurchases, and interest paid 
to equity and bond holders. Recovery rate enters the model as either a modeled or a static 
estimate as further elaborated in chapter 6.3. We chose to use a static estimate, due to our 
failure to create a recovery rate model with significant predictive power, further explained in 
chapter 7.1. 
6.1.1 An extended Merton model 
The model (Eom et al (2004)) consider a defaultable bond with maturity T and unit face value 
that pays semiannual coupons at an annual rate c. For simplicity, we assume that 2T is an 
integer, and let 𝑇𝑛, 𝑛 = 1, … , 2𝑇, be the nth coupon date. We assume that the default barrier 
K is constant and that default is triggered if the asset value is below K on coupon dates. We 
may then price a coupon paying bond as the present value of expected payoffs from coupons 
and the principle: 
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𝑃(0, 𝑇) = ∑ 𝐷(0, 𝑇𝑖)𝐸
𝑄 [(
𝑐
2
) 𝐼
(𝑉𝑇𝑖≥𝐾)
+min (
𝑤𝑐
2
, 𝑉𝑇𝑖) 𝐼(𝑉𝑇𝑖<𝐾)
]
2𝑡−1
𝑖=1
+ 𝐷(0, 𝑇)𝐸𝑄 [(1 +
𝑐
2
) 𝐼(𝑉𝑇≥𝐾) +min (𝑤 (1 +
𝑐
2
) , 𝑉𝑇) 𝐼(𝑉𝑇<𝐾)] 
Where 𝐷(0, 𝑇𝑖) is the time 0 value of a default-free zero-coupon bond maturing at time 𝑇𝑖, 
𝐼(.) is the indicator function, and 𝐸
𝑄 represent the expected value under the risk netural 
measure, and w is the recovery rate. The top part of the formula is simply the risk-neutral 
expected present value of all future coupons of the bond;  𝐷(0, 𝑇𝑖) is the discount factor, 
(
𝑐
2
) 𝐼
(𝑉𝑇𝑖≥𝐾)
 is the value of the semiannual coupon times the risk neutral probability that the 
asset value is above the default barrier at time 𝑇𝑖, and min (
𝑤𝑐
2
, 𝑉𝑇𝑖) 𝐼(𝑉𝑇𝑖<𝐾)
 is the minimum 
value of the asset value and the value of semiannual coupon multiplied with the recovery 
rate, adjusted by the risk neutral probability that the asset value is below the default barrier. 
Similarly, the bottom part is the risk-neutral expected present value of the principal and the 
last coupon paid at maturity. For a more thorough walkthrough of the intuition of the 
equation and its components, see appendix 6B. 
To complete the model, it can be shown that 
𝐸𝑄𝐼
(𝑉𝑇𝑖≥𝐾)
= 𝑁(𝑑2(𝐾, 𝑡)) 
𝐸𝑄[𝐼𝑉𝑡<𝐾min (𝜓, 𝑉𝑡)] = 𝑉0𝐷(0, 𝑡)
−1𝑒−𝛿𝑡𝑁(−𝑑1(𝜓, 𝑡)) + 𝜓[𝑁(𝑑2(𝜓, 𝑡)) − 𝑁(𝑑2(𝐾, 𝑡))] 
where 𝜓 ∈ [0, 𝐾] and N(.) represents the cumulative normal function and 
 
𝑑1(𝑥, 𝑡) =
ln (
𝑉0
𝑥 ∗ 𝐷(0, 𝑡)
) + (−𝛿 + 0,5𝜎𝐴
2)𝑡
𝜎𝐴√𝑡
 (6.1)
13 
 
𝑑2(𝑥, 𝑡) = 𝑑1(𝑥, 𝑡) − 𝜎𝐴√𝑡 
                                                          
13 For a given risk free rate 𝑟, equation (6.1) can be rearranged to: 𝑑1(𝑥, 𝑡) =
ln(
𝑉0
𝑥
)+(𝑟−𝛿+0,5𝜎𝐴
2)𝑡
𝜎𝐴√𝑡
, 
which is the same as 𝑑1 in the Black & Scholes formula but adjusted for a lower drift due to the 
payout ratio. 
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Given the term structure of 𝐷(0, 𝑇𝑖) given by the Nelson-Siegel-Svensson model
14, the given 
equations can be used to calculate the price of a risky coupon bond under Merton’s 
assumptions. 
The yield spread of the bond can then be calculated as the difference of the implied yield of 
the risky bond and a risk free bond: 
𝑠(0, 𝑇) = −
ln(𝑃(0, 𝑇))
𝑇
+
ln (𝐷(0, 𝑇))
𝑇
 
6.2 Parameter estimation 
We will explain how we estimate the various input parameters of the equation in the 
following sections. 
6.2.1 Implied asset value and implied asset volatility 
The asset value and asset volatility are unobservable values, and needs to be estimated. We 
can imply these values by simultaneously solving two functions derived from the Black-
Scholes-Merton framework. In the theory section, we explained how we can use option 
pricing to model a call option on a firm’s assets as a function asset value A, asset volatility 𝜎𝐴, 
time to maturity T,  debt B, and risk free rate r. The only endogenous variables in this equation 
is the asset value and volatility.  This relationship is expressed in equation 6.2. 
 
𝐸 = 𝐴 𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝐵𝑒
−𝑟𝑇𝑁(𝑑2) (6.2) 
  
𝑤here 
𝑑1(𝑥, 𝑡) =
ln (
𝑉0
𝑥 ∗ 𝐷(0, 𝑡)
) + (−𝛿 + 𝜎𝐴
2)𝑡
𝜎𝐴√𝑡
 
𝑑2(𝑥, 𝑡) = 𝑑1(𝑥, 𝑡) − 𝜎𝐴√𝑡 
and N() represents the cumulative normal distribution function. 
Furthermore, using Black and Scholes’ framework, it can be shown that 
                                                          
14 See section 6.2.3 for an explanation of the Nelson-Siegel-Svensson model and our choice of risk 
free rate 
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𝜎𝐸 =
𝐴
𝐸
× 𝑁(𝑑1) × 𝜎𝐴 (6.3) 
We now have two equations, equation 6.2 and 6.3, and two endogenously determined 
variables, asset value and asset volatility. This enables us to solve the two equations 
simultaneously using excels solver function. 
The absence of debt volatility in equation 6.3 can be explained by the fact that equity can be 
described as a portfolio of the firm’s assets and risk free debt. Likewise, it is also possible to 
define the equity volatility as a function of the volatility of assets and the volatility of risk free 
debt. As the volatility of risk free debt is zero, it is intuitively possible to show the volatility of 
equity purely as a function of asset volatility. It is worth mentioning that debt volatility is in 
reality a part of asset volatility, but as we do not need to separate the two, the issue is 
irrelevant in our model. 
6.2.2 The default barrier 
The default barrier is defined as the level the assets must reach for default to happen. How 
the default barrier is modeled varies between models. Some models assume maturity of 1 
year, and for these model’s consensus seems to be that directly using the book value of 
liabilities proves faulty. This is because firms often are allowed to renegotiate or postpone 
debt with longer maturities, and all debt is rarely due within the estimation period. Hence a 
natural choice of default barrier is one less than total debt. Many studies has chosen the same 
default barrier approach as the KMV model (Crosbie & Bohn, 2003), and used short term debt 
plus half of the long term debt as the default barrier. 
𝐵 = 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝑘 × 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 
(Afik, Arad, & Galil, 2012) tests the Merton model with various values of k, i.e. the share of -
noncurrent debt included into the default barrier. They find that the specification of the 
default barrier relative to the market standard of 0.5 has a relatively small effect on the 
models accuracy.  
For papers utilizing greater variation of issue maturities, the norm is different. Feldhütter & 
Schaefer (2014) assume that the default boundary is the book value of liabilities. This 
assumption is also used by Eom et al (2004) and Cremers et al (2008), but Chen et al  (2009) 
and Huang & Huang (2002) use a lower boundary more in line with the KMV methodology. 
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Eom et al (2004) explains the use of book value of liabilities instead of the face value of the 
bond. They explain that in most structural models, including the one we use, equity holders 
earn the residual value of the firm first when all debt has been paid off. As this residual only 
begins to accrue once the par value of the bond is paid and all other debt is paid off, all debt 
must be paid off before equity has any value. As the majority of firms has several sources of 
debt, which also is true for our sample, the book value of liabilities rather than the face value 
of the bond is the correct measure of the default boundary. 
Previous research thus shows various practice, but again it does not seem to impact results 
significantly. To simplify our analysis, we have in our model defined the default barrier as the 
total book value of liabilities at issue date, both with regards to defaults on coupons and on 
the principal payments. 
6.2.3 Choice of risk free rate 
We have chosen to use government treasuries with various maturities as our risk free rate. 
These are not completely without risk, but are considered the asset class with the lowest risk. 
This is especially true for the Scandinavian countries, the EU, and the US, which is the source 
countries in our paper and are considered some of the safest government bonds attainable. 
Some choose to use the bank swap rate less 20-30 bps, but the choice does not seem to 
impact the results significantly in previous research papers. 
We have gathered government bonds from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the European Union, 
and the US. We have gathered all available maturities between 1 and 10 years. We have then 
used the Nelson-Siegel-Svendsson model to interpolate and extrapolate the missing dates. 
For the longest maturities, e.g. bonds with maturity of more than15 years, we have manually 
checked that the model estimates are plausible. This method of modeling the yield curve was 
first developed by (Nelson & Siegel, 1987), and later extended by (Svensson, 1994). The 
method involves reducing the sum of residual of the actual observations and the model 
estimates. 
The model itself is given as 
𝐷(0, 𝑥) = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 ∗
1 − 𝑒
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𝑥
𝜆1
)
𝑥
𝜆1
+ 𝛽3(
1 − 𝑒
(−
𝑥
𝜆1
)
𝑥
𝜆1
− 𝑒
(−
𝑥
𝜆1
)
) + 𝛽4(
1 − 𝑒
(−
𝑥
𝜆2
)
𝑥
𝜆2
− 𝑒
(−
𝑥
𝜆2
)
) 
52 
 
The maturity of each coupon/principal has been matched with relevant government bond in 
terms of both currency and maturity. 
6.2.4 Standard deviation of equity 
The equity standard deviation is calculated from 5 years of monthly data. The asset standard 
deviation is derived from the black & Scholes framework as described in detail earlier. 
6.2.5 Payout ratio 
We calculate payout ratio as explained by Eom et al (2004). . Observation time is year before 
issue, in line with previous papers (Feldhütter & Schaefer (2014), Eom et al (2004)). We 
calculate the payout ratio as the sum of dividends, share repurchases adjusted for stock splits, 
interest payments to debt- and equity holders, and then divide by total assets. 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
=
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 +  𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 +  𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠)
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
  
Estimates of payout ratios are based on historic observations. It is naturally to assume that 
firms will adjust their payout policy according to future investment plans and current 
profitability. If a firm is experiencing solvency issues, we expect it to reduce its payout to 
equity holders. To incorporate this effect, we set dividends and share repurchases to zero for 
issuers with estimated asset value less than two standard deviations from debt value. 
6.3 Predicting loss given default 
Section 6.2 introduced the model that will be used to predict spreads in the analysis later in 
this paper. The model depends on several variables, of which an estimate of the recovery rate 
in the case of a default is especially important. This section will explore the possibility of 
modelling recovery rates, so that individual estimates of recovery rates for each bond can be 
incorporated in the credit model presented previously. 
To estimate loss given default, or 1 – recovery rate, we create a statistical model based on the 
recovery rate dataset of initially 150 defaulted bonds. The model is based on a multivariate 
OLS regression, which incorporate industry-, issuer-, as well as bond-specific information. This 
part will present the statistical methods applied and the motivation behind them. 
Subsequently, we test potential explanatory factors, before we analyze and discuss the power 
of the recovery rate model.  
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6.3.1 Selecting statistical framework 
The first step to create a Recovery rate model (RR model) is to decide on the most suitable 
statistical framework, given the properties of our data and the model’s objective. In the 
literature review, we found that recovery rate modeling have changed over time, and also 
that there still is significant variation in later studies’ assumptions and choice of statistical 
framework, and hence it was not straightforward for us to find an approach for our model. 
The various techniques has specific strengths and weaknesses, but we found no consensus in 
the literature of what type of model to be the most precise. Furthermore, it was a criteria for 
us that we use a statistical framework reasonably within our econometric capabilities. With 
this in mind, we decided to use an ordinary least squared regression (OLS)15, but to adjust for 
default clusters by only including one defaulted bond per issuer within one month time 
period. 
The model itself is not bound to any specific interval. Predicted values must therefore be 
transformed to ensure that the recovery rate is bound between 0 and 1 if they are to be used 
in the credit model. 
6.3.2 Exclusion of observations 
Many of the issuers in the recovery dataset have multiple defaulted bonds around the same 
dates. To avoid biased estimators due to double counting in the regression, we excluded all 
44 repetitive bond defaults, defined as bonds defaulted in the same year, from the same 
issuer, and with equal security. 
In addition, we excluded 7 issuers due to inaccessible financial data, reducing the final default 
sample to 95 bonds 16. 
  
                                                          
15 See appendix 3A for an introduction of OLS regression theory 
16 See appendix 5A an overview of excluded issuers. 
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7 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
This analysis has three main objectives: First, to estimate issue specific recovery rates. Second, 
to estimate and analyze the credit risk component of Nordic high yield bond spreads. Third, 
to identify and measure additional factors affecting the credit spreads. 
The analytic procedure is performed in three steps. First, we use a multivariate OLS regression 
to attempt to create a model suitable for estimating individual recovery rates. Second, we use 
our structural credit model to predict spreads, which are compared to actual spreads to test 
the model’s predictive power and to measure the share of the credit spread explained by 
default risk. Third, we subtract the predicted spreads from the actual spreads observed in the 
market. We perform a multivariate regression to identify and measure sources of this 
residual. The residual is argued to include compensation for risk aversion and extra risk 
premium for non-default related risks, illiquidity and migration risk. We start off with a more 
detailed motivation for the twofold analytic procedure. 
The previous chapter gave a detailed description of the methodology used to predict spreads. 
The model spread equals the predicted expected loss of the bond, and hence, the expected 
total return of the bond investment equals the risk free rate. The model therefore implies 
that credit investors are risk-neutral and are only to be compensated by the expected loss. As 
discussed earlier in this paper, the average investor is more likely to have some degree of risk 
aversion and will demand compensation for the uncertainty of the expected return inherent 
in the investment. Furthermore, we presented several non-diversifiable risk-factors that 
investors demand compensation for bearing. 
The actual spread levels are therefore expected to be above the predicted spreads, as the 
latter only account for default risk. This implies that the structural credit model may not be 
adequate to predict the absolute level of spreads. However, default risk constitute a 
significant part of the total risk and should thus be a good predictor of relative differences in 
credit spreads. The former statement relies on the systematic risk premium to be relatively 
constant among the issuers in the sample. For instance, if the issuers’ exposure to systematic 
risk factors vary greatly, the variation in spreads may just as likely be explained by different 
sensitivity to systematic risk as default risk levels. The third part of the analysis will attempt 
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to explain the variation in these risk premiums. We start by attempting to estimate issue 
specific recovery rates, and continue by comparing and analyzing the predicted and actual 
spreads. 
7.1 Predicting recovery rates 
Our analysis starts by attempting to estimate issue specific recovery rates, as it is an important 
input factor for our credit risk model. We begin by giving a rational for the explanatory 
variables included in our regression, and continue with a presentation and analysis of the 
regression results. 
7.1.1 Explanatory variables 
To explain the variation in recovery rates we include a set of both issuer and bond specific 
variables in addition to industry dummy variables.  
Of the issuer specific variables, five are financial ratios representing firm fundamentals that 
we believe have an effect on recovery rates. The relative amount of intangibles and 
receivables are included as these balance sheet items has lower collateral value than tangible 
assets and liquid funds and will thus lead to lower recovery at default. 
Book equity ratio value is included to instrument the financial solidity of the firm. The 
argument for inclusion is that with a high equity ratio the firm can suffer a larger loss before 
debt holders are severely affected. The profitability of the firm prior default is likely to 
indicate what condition the firm is in at default. For instance, if a firm default due to 
temporarily liquidity issues, the outcome of a restructuring process is likely to yield higher 
recovery for profitable firms. Also, the share of long term debt relative to total debt was 
included, which is motivated by the fact that long term debt is a more stable funding source, 
less likely to cause default, short term, and more likely to cooperate to a restructuring.  
Distance to default is the same variable as the one introduced in section 4.1.2, and is included 
to account for a potential inverse relationship between default risk and recovery rate. 
Furthermore, it is also arguably a proxy for the market’s expected asset value, which obviously 
affects the recovery rate in a default event. 
In addition to firm fundamentals, bond specific factors are believed to contribute additionally 
to explain recovery rates. Even bonds issued by the same firm may have varying recovery rate 
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depending on the priority in the capital structure and collateral security. We therefore include 
dummy variables for senior secured, senior unsecured, and subordinated bonds.   
Finally, we include industry dummy variables to account for industry specific effects. Previous 
literature has found industry to be an important indicator of recovery rates, and practitioners 
often rely on refined industry averages as recovery estimates (Gupton & Stein, 2005). Due to 
low number of observations in some industries, we only include the five industries with the 
most default observations17. 
Other explanatory variables could be included to improve the model. For instance, credit 
rating was found to be significant in Jankowitsch, Nagler, & Subrahmanyam’s (2014) study on 
recovery rates in the US market. However, very few Nordic bonds have official credit ratings, 
and we were not able to attain shadow rating for Nordic arranging banks. 
Type of credit event was tested to be have significant explanatory power and would likely 
improve the model. However, to ensure the out-of-sample power of this analysis it is 
important that only information available to an investor at the time of issue is used. It would 
be difficult, if not impossible, to predict if a potential credit event results in a liquidation, or a 
distressed exchange, every time one would use the model.  
Table 7.1 presents an overview of the variables included in the OLS-regression. 
Table 7.1: Explanatory variables 
 
 
All financial variables are defined as ratios in order to make them comparable across different 
                                                          
17 See Appendix 5B for an overview of number of default per industry in the regression sample 
Variable Definition Variable Definition
Equity ratio: Seniority and security:
Receivables: Profitability:
Long term debt (LTD):
Distance to Default 
(DD):
Intangibles: Industry:𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛 𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
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currencies, and are calculated using financial statements one year prior the initial credit 
event. 
7.1.2 Regression Results 
We performed multiple regressions to test the significance, direction, and magnitude of the 
explanatory variables for recovery rates we motivated above. The regression outputs are 
summarized in table 6.1 below. 
Table 7.2: Recovery rate regression outputs 
 
 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
LTD -0.0935 -0.115
(-0.668) (-0.866)
Intang 0.187 0.0110
(1.297) (0.0657)
Receiv 0.569 0.558
(1.554) (1.328)
EqRatio 0.105 0.0487
(0.621) (0.284)
Prof 0.155 0.218
(1.047) (1.511)
DD -0.0398 -0.0175
(-1.185) (-0.532)
SeniorUS 0.0317 0.0655
(0.423) (0.871)
Subordinated -0.258** -0.251** -0.304***
(-2.268) (-2.220) (-2.941)
EandP 0.212 0.117
(1.631) (0.826)
OilService 0.0931 0.0291
(0.789) (0.247)
Shipping -0.301* -0.427** -0.458***
(-1.738) (-2.460) (-3.369)
Industry 0.132 0.0789
(0.828) (0.487)
TelecomIT 0.160 -0.0227
(1.038) (-0.121)
Constant 0.376*** 0.411*** 0.459*** 0.348*** 0.414** 0.505***
(2.750) (9.433) (9.362) (3.285) (2.531) (13.91)
Observations 95 95 95 95 95 95
R-squared 0.092 0.015 0.065 0.119 0.267 0.166
Adjusted R-squared 0.0409 0.00429 0.0445 0.0696 0.149 0.148
t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The dummy variables for subordinated bonds and shipping are the only significant 
explanatory variables, and are consistent across the models. However, the number of 
observations within the dummy subsamples are small, and should be interpreted with care. 
If we were to rely on model (6), it implies that all else equal, subordinated bonds on average 
recover 30.4 percentage points less than senior secured bonds, which is the benchmark with 
respect to seniority. Furthermore, it implies that defaulted bonds within the shipping sector 
recover 45.8 percentage point lower than other sectors. 
Unfortunately for the predictive power of the model, only the two dummy variables were 
proven significant. Consequently, the result is a model that is no more advanced, or precise 
than using a table of averages as estimates. Furthermore, the variance within the sub samples 
created by the dummy variables are too high to infer any valid relationship, except for 
subordinated bonds and shipping. These facts raise concerns about the predictive power of 
the recovery rate model. 
The reason to the less conclusive results is likely to be both low degrees of freedom after 
correcting for default clusters, and the fact that the outcome of a default event is the result 
of a bargaining process between debt holders and debt issuer, which may be unsystematic 
and difficult to model. 
In the subsequent anaylysis of bond spreads, as mentioned before, a key criteria is to only 
utilize information availible at the time of issue. If the recovery model mostly rely on industry 
and seniority averages from realized default events, the problems of overfitting is likely to be 
present and result in information that investors was likely to not have. For these reasons and 
to secure the validity of our bond spread analysis, we rely on static LGD estimates in line with 
litterature and practicioners when applying the credit model in the following analysis. 
Even with low predictive power, the previous recovery rate analysis may shed some 
interesting light to the analyses of credit spreads in the following. First, we should pay 
attention to significant results related to the shipping sector, as low expected recovery may 
be a contributor. Second, if an unsystematic process in fact drives recovery rates, we should 
be careful to use recovery rates as a major explanatory factor for variation in spreads within 
subsamples of bonds. For instance, we did not find firm fundamentals to explain the recovery 
rate variation within any of the industry subsamples. 
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Lower recovery for subordinated bonds would initially also be an interesting factor to apply. 
However, the high yield sample in the following analysis only include two subordinated bonds. 
7.2 Comparisons of predicted and actual spreads 
This section will present descriptive statistics of the predicted spreads from our structural 
model. We compare them to actual spreads for the respective bond sample, and use the 
results to differentiate the credit loss part of the credit spread from other risk factors. 
Note that observed spreads throughout the analysis are based on one observation for each 
bond at issue and is assumed issued at par. The credit spread is therefore calculated using the 
coupon rate as the yield to maturity. 
Table 7.1 presents a summary of predicted and actual spreads measured in basis points (bps) 
for the sample overall and for two sub-samples of defaulted vs non-defaulted bonds. The 
predicted spreads are lower than actual spreads, with an average spread of 340 and 518 bps 
respectively. This is in line with the prior expectations, that default risk does not explain the 
credit spread in full. However, our model spreads are higher compared to what Sæbø (2014) 
finds in his analysis, even though his sample has higher average actual spreads then ours. The 
predicted sample has a larger range of spreads, from close to 0 to around 1,650 bps, and has 
notably higher variance than the actual spread sample. Observing some cases of predicted 
spreads close to 0 bps is in conflict with reality. The explanation is that some firms in our 
sample has a very low leverage ratio. The structural model then calculate the probability of 
default to be almost absent, resulting in severely under prediction.  
By looking more closely on the subsamples of defaulted vs non-defaulted bonds, it is evident 
that the market is able to price defaulted bonds lower on average, i.e. with higher spreads. 
The bonds that defaulted have significantly higher spreads than those who did not. 
Interestingly, the model attains similar results. In fact, the model spreads infer an even larger 
relative difference in spread between defaulted and non-defaulted bonds, which will be 
examined in more detail when we analyze the mispricing between model and actual spreads. 
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Table 7.3: Overview of model spreads and actual spreads at issue (bps) 
 
 
We rely on both absolute and relative measures to analyze the mispricing between model 
and actual spreads, using similar definitions as Sæbø (2014). Absolute mispricing is defined 
as the model spread subtracted from the actual spread. Relative mispricing is defined by the 
following formula: 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑛 𝑖,𝑡 = 1 −
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡
 
The two measures basically describes the same. However, the relative measures is more easily 
comparable between different dimensions. An important distinction arise when using 
mispricing to estimate risk premiums. Absolute and relative measures of mispricing may lead 
to the opposite conclusion regarding which sample of bonds that has the highest/lowest risk 
premium compensation. For instance, Sæbø (2014) finds that the relative mispricing was the 
highest for high quality bonds, and declined with lower quality, and that the complete 
opposite was true when measured in absolute terms. 
The appropriate measure to use depends on how risk premium is assumed to be incorporated 
in the total spread prediction. If the risk premium was to be a factor to be multiplied with the 
expected loss, the relative measure would be the correct one. However, if the risk premium 
is a term that is to be added to the expected loss, then the absolute mispricing would be the 
correct measure. Due to the fact that the risk premium contain non-default related risks, e.g. 
non-diversifiable market risk and liquidity risk, we argue that it should not be affected by the 
initial level of the spread, as is the case for the relative measure. We will therefore rely on the 
relative measure only when comparing spreads, and use the absolute measure when we 
discuss the level of risk premium inherent in the observed spreads, and assume the following 
relationship: 
 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 = 𝐸𝐿𝑖 + 𝜆𝑖  
Mean STD Max Min Mean STD Max Min N
Defaulted bonds 610 481 1647 64 788 278 1342 300 49
Non-Defaulted bonds 291 351 1699 0 469 260 1406 35 274
All 340 390 1699 0 518 286 1406 35 323
Model spread Actual spread
61 
 
Where 𝐸𝐿𝑖  is the predicted expected loss and 𝜆𝑖 is the risk premium for bond 𝑖. Consequently, 
the model defines the risk premium as the absolute difference between the observed spread 
and the expected loss: 
 𝜆𝑖 = 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 − 𝐸𝐿𝑖   
The average transaction-by-transaction relative mispricing for the sample overall is 35 
percent (table 7.2). This indicates that, on average, as much as 65 percent of the credit spread 
is explained by default risk according to our extended structural model. In absolute terms, the 
average mispricing is 178 bps. However, note that variation in mispricing is large and does 
suffer influence from a small number of extreme differences. The table also show that the 
minimum mispricing is below -400 bps, which may seem odd as first. Such observations simply 
mean that the model spread is higher than actual spread, i.e. the predicted expected loss is 
higher than what can be implied in the observed spread. 
Table 7.4: Relative and absolute mispricing 
 
 
The average relative mispricing within the two sub-samples of defaulted and non-defaulted 
bonds is 15 and 38 bps respectively. The model has significantly (p=0.025)18 lower relative 
mispricing for defaulted than for non-defaulted bonds. This means that, on average, predicted 
spreads are significantly closer to actual spreads for bonds that defaulted, than for those who 
did not. An interesting interpretation of the preceding is that, in isolation, the structural 
model was better to estimate the default risk than the market. This bold claim require a 
robustness check.  
Firstly, we observed earlier that the majority of defaulted bonds belong in the high spread 
environment. Hence, the findings above may simply be due to better prediction ability in this 
area. In table 7.3 we have divided the sample in two groups according to spread level at issue. 
The “High spread environment” group consist of all bonds with spreads higher than the 
median of 475 bps, and the “Low spread environment” consist of the remaining bonds with 
                                                          
18 Using a two-sample student t-test assuming equal variance 
Mean STD Max Min Mean STD Max Min N
Defaulted bonds 15 78 93 -198 178 535 999 -1079 49
Non-Defaulted bonds 38 73 100 -404 178 341 1269 -984 274
All 35 74 100 -404 178 376 1269 -1079 323
  Relative mispricing (%)   Absolute mispricing (bps)
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lower spreads at issue. The relative mispricing does not seem to be any notably different 
between the two groups. This implies that the model has equal prediction power for high 
spread bonds as for low spread bonds, and that this is not the source of lower mispricing for 
defaulted bonds.  
Secondly, one may propose that this finding could be due to differences in non-default related 
risk premiums. However, there is no intuitive explanation for defaulted bonds to be less 
exposed to non-diversifiable risks than those who did not default. The issue of accounting for 
non-diversifiable risk premiums will be the focus in the next sub-chapter. 
Table 7.5: Breakdown of relative mispricing in high and low spread environment 
 
 
We further examine the effect of the financial crises in 2008 on average spreads at issue and 
the explanatory share of the credit model. Table 7.4 divides the sample in bonds issued prior 
and post the financial crisis, defined by the fall of Lehman Brothers on 15. September 2008 
(similar approach as Sæbø (2015)). As expected, the average spreads in the market are 
notably higher in the aftermath of the financial crises. The model also responds to lower 
equity values and increased volatility by predicting higher spreads on average. In fact, the part 
of the credit spread explained by the model increases to 71 percent from initially 59 percent. 
This is in line with the findings of Sæbø (2015), that the part explained by default risk 
increased after the financial crisis. However, in absolute terms, the mispricing increases. Even 
though the model responds to the increased risk, it seems that the uncertainty in the financial 
markets increased credit spreads even more.  
Table 7.6: Breakdown of mispricing prior and post the financial crisis 
 
In this section we found that our model explain 65 percent of the observed spread on average, 
leaving 35 percent unexplained. In absolute terms, the unexplained credit spread amount to 
Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD N
High spread enviroment 485 450 746              223 33                66               158
Low spread enviroment 200 256 299              120 36                82               165
All 340 390 518 286 35                74               323
           Relative mispricing         Model spread (bps)             Actual spread
Predicted spreads Actual spreads Relative mispricing % explained Absolute mispricing
Prior financial crisis 258 399 41 59 141
Post financial crisis 413 624 29 71 211
All 340 518 35 65 178
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178 bps, both within the default- and non-default sample. This represent an estimate of the 
average compensation for non-diversifiable risks, illiquidity and migration risk. The estimate 
may also contain random errors or market mispricing. The following section will attempt to 
identify and measure sources of the observed premium. 
7.3 Identifying sources of risk premium 
This section will use the absolute mispricing between expected loss and observed spreads 
found in the previous analysis as an estimate of risk premium, and attempt to identify and 
measure sources to explain the variation within the sample. The theory section described four 
main sources of none-diversifiable risk premiums in bond spreads; Risk aversion, migration, 
illiquidity, and market risk. 
We choose to do a regression analysis of the difference between our model spreads and 
actual spreads in order to explain the content of the mispricing. We do this through an OLS 
regression and use absolute mispricing as our dependent variable19. The method follows that 
of Sæbø (2015) and Eom et al. (2004), and we will throughout this section compare our results 
with those of previous studies.  
To get an overview of which explanatories could be important, we divide the sample in one 
group with mispricing higher than the median, and one group with mispricing lower than the 
median. We continue by performing simple t-tests to determine variation in 14 selected 
variables among the two groups20. We find that observations with high mispricing has 
significantly lower maturity, size, and market leverage, and significantly higher coupon. We 
also find that the oil price were significantly higher at the time of issue for bonds with high 
mispricing. 
We start by explaining our rational for the explanatory variables chosen to be included in our 
OLS-regression. 
7.3.1 Industry 
We have included dummy variables for the major industries represented in our sample. As 
shown in appendix 4B, the industry groups “Oil and gas services”, “Oil & gas E&P”, “Industry”, 
                                                          
19 See section 6.3.2 for details on how and why an OLS regression is performed, and the underlying 
assumptions of the OLS regression method. 
20 See appendix 4H for t-test outputs 
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and “Shipping” are the groups most heavily represented. The remaining industry groups are 
included as the omitted dummy variable. Sæbø (2015) finds that industry group is able to 
explain a significant amount of variation between firms. The reason is likely to be that some 
industries are more sensitive to market risk than others and that the industry dummy 
variables account for the related premium. Additionally, investor’s may require compensation 
for industry specific downside risk, and so we expect our dummies to be significant. 
7.3.2 Size 
Size is a risk factor well known as one of the Fama-French factors (Fama & French, 1993). 
There are several intuitive reasons to why larger companies often are perceived less risky. For 
instance, large companies often have a broader customer base, more stable bank financing, 
more diversified products etc. We measured size as market capitalization of equity at the time 
of issue, denominated in million NOK. Both Sæbø (2015) and Eom et al. (2004) show that this 
is an important factor to include, and that the variable explains a significant amount of 
variation in the mispricing. We expect larger companies to have lower spreads due to lower 
sensitivity to market factors, and hence that the sign of the coefficient to be negative.  
7.3.3 Market leverage 
Market leverage is one of the key inputs of our spread model, and hence is important to test. 
We define market leverage as Market capitalization divided by total book value of liabilities. 
Eom et al. (2004) found that all the 5 structural models they tested had systematic errors 
related to leverage. They highlight that the models do a poor job of pricing safer bonds with 
low leverage, which to us is a good result as we only study high-risk bonds in this paper. They 
further note that this might indicate that leverage is poorly estimated or that the models fail 
to assign the appropriate risk to each level of leverage. As stated by Eom et al. (2004), the 
model has a tendency to severely under predict spreads for low leveraged companies. The 
model sometimes estimate spreads close to zero, while observed spreads always are higher. 
If this tendency appears to be systematic, we would expect to see a negative sign for this 
variable, i.e. the structural model under (over) estimates spreads for low (high) leveraged 
companies. Otherwise, if our structural model is the “true” model, it is expected to be 
insignificant. 
7.3.4 Oil price 
We include a variable representing the oil price on the date of the issue. Oil price is regarded 
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as a significant factor for the real economy and especially for the Norwegian. Furthermore, as 
about 70 % of our sample consist of bonds issued in NOK (appendix 4E), the reason for 
including it is even greater. Hence we are curious to see the effect this variable might have on 
mispricing. Sæbø (2015) tests the significance of the oil price on the Norwegian bond market, 
but his results are inconclusive.  
7.3.5 Years until maturity 
Years until maturity has been shown to be a significant factor for the structural models, and 
tells us to expect that structural models especially struggle with predicting high enough 
spreads on short maturity bonds as there is not a sufficient timespan for the volatility to come 
into play (Eom et al., 2004). Maturities in our sample have great dispersion, with the majority 
between 0.5 and 5 years. Hence; we expect the sign of the coefficient to be negative. 
7.3.6 Price/book value 
We have included market capitalization divided by book value of equity as an explanatory 
variable. The inclusion of this variable is motivated by being one of the Fama-French risk 
factors, where low price/book ratios represent value stocks, and high price/book ratios 
represent growth stocks. Value stocks are perceived to represent the risk factor of the two. 
This is motivated by a higher exposure to “business-cycle-risk”, which means that value stocks 
as a group are more affected in a downturn (Fama & French, 1993).  Sæbø (2015) found this 
variable to be significant in many of the models he ran, but highly unstable and hence deemed 
as a non-relevant variable. Eom et al. (2004) did not include price/book-value as a variable in 
their analysis. Nevertheless, the high importance of the factor for the equity market, makes 
this variable interesting to test. 
7.3.7 Illiquidity 
Liquidity is important for bond investors. A larger part of the corporate bond market suffer 
from low trading volumes, which leads to higher and more volatile bid ask spreads. The result 
may be delays in finding a counterparty for a transaction and lower realized price in the case 
of a sale. Due to these reasons, liquidity premium is one of the most common explanatories 
of the extra risk premium investigated in literature and is naturally included in the regression 
analysis. There are, however, different ways to define and incorporate the variable. 
Sæbø (2015) includes the bid-ask spread of government treasuries, as a proxy on the general 
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liquidity in the market, but this variable does not incorporate the liquidity of individual bonds. 
He also points to the possibility of including issue size as a proxy, but this would probably 
generate problems of multicollinearity with the firm size variable. A third option he mentions 
is the use of bond bid/ask spreads. However, we were not able to obtain detailed historic data 
on these spreads  
As a fourth option, included in order to capture some of the individual variation between 
bonds, we include a variable measuring days with registered trades in the issuer’s equity. We 
define this variable as the number of days with registered trades in the year prior to issue 
divided by possible trade days in said year. With further investigation, we find that the 
majority of the observations are close to 100%. Another shortfall is that there might be a 
multicollinearity problem with the included size variable21. Hence, we instead wish to 
highlight those firms with what we define as a high liquidity ratio vs. those with a low ratio. 
We set this limit to 90 %, as we have a significant cluster above 90 %, and with significant 
dispersion of those below 90 %, and include the variable as a dummy. Hence, a dummy value 
of 1 indicates a high liquidity bond, and dummy value of 0 indicates a low liquidity bond. 
We use this ratio as an indicator of bond liquidity because we believe that if the related stock 
of a bond has low liquidity, it is also likely that the bond itself has low liquidity. Using a bond 
liquidity proxy from the equity market is partly motivated by limited alternatives, but also by 
the fact that other research have found interesting results using similar methods22. 
7.3.8 Time dummy 
To test time varying effects, we include a dummy indicating whether an issue was made post 
or prior the financial crisis. A widely accepted definition of the beginning of the crisis is 15. 
September 2015, which marks the fall of the Lehman Brothers. This is also the same date used 
by Sæbø (2015), making our results more comparable. Increased general risk and uncertainty 
in the market after the crisis motivates an expectation of higher absolute mispricing after the 
crisis. The dummy is defined as 1 if the observation is after the crisis, and 0 if it is before. 
                                                          
21 See plot illustrating potential multicollinearity in appendix 4J 
22 See for instance de Jong & Driessen Invalid source specified. 
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7.3.9 Security 
We have included a dummy indicating whether the bond is senior secured or senior 
unsecured. An overview can be seen in appendix 4D. Our structural model does not 
incorporate security in its spread prediction, and hence we expect unsecured bonds to have 
a higher degree of absolute mispricing than secured bonds. A dummy of 1 indicates a senior 
secured bond, while a dummy of 0 indicates a senior unsecured bond. 
7.3.10 Floating vs. fixed rate bonds 
We have included bonds with both fixed and floating coupon in our sample, despite Merton’s 
assumption of fixed rate bonds. Furthermore, we observe that fixed interest rates have been 
consistently higher than floating interest rates during the sample period. We have included a 
dummy variable indicating whether the bond is of floating or fixed rate due to this fact. This 
is done as a corrective measure for the regression analysis, and will not be interpreted as an 
explanatory factor of risk premium. A dummy of 1 indicates a fixed rate bond, while a dummy of 0 
indicates a floating rate bond. 
7.3.11 Variables not included in our analysis 
We have limited our choice of variables due to both data availability, time restrictions, and to 
avoid over-fitting a small sample with too many independent variables. However, we are 
aware that previous research has tested a number of additional variables that could be 
significant for our analysis. Eom et al. (2004) implements a wide array of variables, but a 
reason for this is that they test not only the Merton model, but also four other structural 
models, all incorporating different factors. They test all variables included in their Merton 
model; coupon, payout ratio, asset volatility, market leverage, and size. They also test for 
several other variables theory predict might have an impact on spreads; most notably are 
term structure (defined as the difference between the 2 year and 10 year treasury yield), 
credit rating, and PPE/Assets. Of variables not included in our analyses, Sæbø (2015) includes 
excess return of OSEBX and relative bid/ask spread on treasuries 
Of the variables present in our spread model, we have only included maturity and market 
leverage. This is because previous studies have shown that these variables are the ones 
structural models have the most trouble incorporating. Including credit (shadow) rating from 
a bank could give interesting insight, but were unfortunately not available to us. The excess 
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return of OSEBX was deemed insignificant by Sæbø (2015) and were hence not included. We 
were unable to find data easily implementable for relative bid/ask spreads of treasuries. 
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7.4 Regression analysis 
In this section we perform multiple regressions to test the significance, direction, and 
magnitude of the explanatory variables motivated in the previous section. Selected regression 
outputs are summarized in table 7.1 below. As previously reasoned, we have chosen to use 
absolute mispricing as the regressions’ dependent variable, defined as actual observed spread 
subtracted predicted model spread. The interpretation of the coefficient will therefore be as 
follows: A positive coefficient will indicate a higher premium related to the variable. A 
negative coefficient will indicate a discount related to the variable. 
In model 1 we start by running a regression only including industry dummies, in order to get 
an initial view of their significance. In model 2 we continue by running a regression omitting 
maturity and leverage, to test a model without variables included in our structural model. In 
model 3 we include all discussed variables, and in model 4 we add a time dummy indicating 
if the issue observation was made before or after the financial crisis. For a discussion of the 
OLS assumptions in conjunction with the regression, see appendix 3C. 
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Table 7.7: Regression outputs 
 
We begin by taking a look at the industry dummies. In model 1 we see that the Shipping 
dummy is significant at the 1 % level, a result consistent throughout all our models. This might 
imply that the shipping industry group is more exposed to systematic market risk than other 
industries in the sample. The shipping industry is well known to be a highly volatile and cyclical 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Industry 68.80 64.61 103.4 107.8
(63.65) (65.65) (64.52) (67.11)
Oil and gas services 26.77 60.49 108.7** 137.5***
(59.19) (56.30) (48.74) (50.66)
Oil and gas E&P 49.35 52.92 11.01 18.48
(77.74) (81.19) (74.05) (72.70)
Shipping 232.0*** 249.1*** 231.8*** 238.7***
(68.14) (70.07) (66.19) (62.69)
Size 8.28e-05 -0.000162 -0.000604
(0.00102) (0.00144) (0.00153)
Price/book 2.093 -11.08** -5.549
(7.032) (5.173) (5.348)
Security -147.2* -100.6 -94.80
(80.09) (72.10) (71.01)
Oil price 0.648 1.431* -0.238
(0.912) (0.816) (1.118)
Liquidity -95.42 -114.7* -113.5*
(74.46) (68.05) (67.97)
Return Type 157.9*** 164.2*** 160.9***
(52.96) (47.79) (47.79)
Maturity -23.91** -20.52**
(10.05) (10.10)
Market Leverage -70.43*** -76.54***
(10.15) (11.11)
Financial Crisis Dummy 172.8**
(67.73)
Constant 35.41 24.14 220.5* 238.9**
(38.27) (122.2) (118.8) (119.1)
Observations 310 310 310 310
R-squared 0.027 0.078 0.221 0.242
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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industry, which might be why we find this variable to be significant at such a consistent level. 
However, this may also be explained through the findings from our LGD regression23, which 
finds the Shipping industry group to have significantly lower recovery rates than other 
industries. This indicates that we use a too high recovery rate in our spread prediction model, 
which in turn causes underestimation of spreads in the form of an underestimation of credit 
risk. 
The remaining industry group dummies for Industry, Oil and gas Services, and Oil and gas E&P 
is not consistently significant across our models. Oil and gas services is significant in model 3 
and 4, but we observe again in section 6.3.6 that this group has a lower recovery rate than 
the rest of the sample, although not as low for the Shipping group. With inconsistent 
significance and biased recovery rate coming into play, it is difficult to draw any conclusions. 
Such a low significance of industry dummies is quite contrary of Sæbø`s (2015) finding, which 
is that industry can determine a significant amount of the mispricing. A reason might be that 
we use a too small sample both in our spread and recovery rate regression to find significant 
results, and another reason might that industry group determines less of the variation in 
spreads for high yield bonds than for investment grade bonds (which constitutes the majority 
of Sæbø’s (2015) sample). This can be explained by the economic intuition that a relatively 
larger percentage of the observed spreads are explained by credit risk for high yield than for 
investment grade bonds, giving motivation to claim that factors like industry group has a 
smaller absolute impact on the spread of high yield bonds. 
We find both the two variables already included in our spread model, Market Leverage and 
time until maturity, to be significant in the regression. The first variable, Market leverage, is 
significant and with a negative sign. This is the same result as Eom et al. (2004), who found 
market leverage to be significant for a range of different structural models. As high yield 
bonds are mainly issued by firms with high leverage, this might be an indication that the 
spread model is better at predicting spreads for high yield bonds than for investment grade 
bonds, and that higher leverage in turn means lower mispricing. It also implies that our 
structural model is struggling to assign the proper amount of risk for different leverage levels, 
especially true for low leverage issuers. The second variable we test that also is a part of our 
                                                          
23 See section 6.3.6 
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credit model is Maturity, which is shown to be significant and negative in both model 3 and 
4. The negative relationship found indicates that high maturity bonds have the lowest degree 
of mispricing, which also is in line with the findings of Eom et al (2004), and the common 
perception that structural models struggles with predicting high enough spreads on low 
maturity bonds. In model 2, we include all explanatory variables except those already 
included in our spread model, and witness that the R-squared changes significantly from 7.8 
% in model 2 to 22.1 % in model 3. This gives further motivation to claim that market leverage 
and maturity indeed are important correctional factors to include in the regression, and 
highlights the structural models difficulty of properly incorporating them. 
Our next factor of consideration is liquidity. The dummy included as a proxy for bond liquidity 
is shown to be significant, and implies that high liquidity has a negative impact on mispricing. 
The result is true for all models except in model (2), where we remove variables included in 
the spread model. It is difficult to conclude why the removal of the variables leverage and 
years until maturity, whereas leverage is the main source of effect, has this impact. Note that 
we do not find any indications of multicollinearity between Liquidity, Leverage, and Years until 
maturity in the correlation table in appendix 3C. Nevertheless, the finding that the market 
leverage and years until maturity are significant variables motivates the conclusion that 
model 2 might be a biased regression by omitting these variables. Our findings regarding the 
liquidity ratio implies that the structural model predicts more accurate results for firms with 
high liquidity, or possibly that these firms entail a larger degree of migration risk24. Although 
it is not possible to separate the effect of migration risk and liquidity risk, the finding supports 
the view that liquidity is of significance to investors, and that they demand a premium for low 
liquidity issues. Our results indicate a liquidity premium of up to 110 bps, which is within the 
range of what is found in previous studies25. 
In model 4, we include a dummy indicating whether the observation is prior or post of the 
financial crisis26. The dummy is significant, and indicates higher mispricing after the crisis. 
                                                          
24 Migration risk and liquidity risk is linked by the fact that if a firms rating drops, and its debts 
liquidity in addition is low, the price impact on the bond will be higher. 
25 An example is de Jong & Driessen Invalid source specified. who found the premium to be 150 bps 
per annum for speculative grade bonds. 
26 An effort was made to sort the sample in two group divided by the start of the financial crisis. 
However, the individual sample sizes proved too small to produce significant results 
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From table 7.4, we observed that the model predicts higher spreads after the fall of Lehman 
Brothers, and that default risk explained a greater part than before. This is broadly in line with 
what Sæbø (2015) finds regarding the effect of the financial crisis. A potential explanation is 
that even though equity prices declined, and the model’s default risk increased, the 
uncertainty in the capital markets raised credit spreads even more, resulting in a net 
increased average mispricing in the aftermath of the financial crisis.  
Price/book value provide an interesting and significant effect in model 3. The negative 
coefficient implies that growth stocks (high P/B) has lower risk premium than value stocks 
(low P/B). This is in line with the theoretical motivation presented by Fama and French (1993). 
Although interesting, the variable is unstable and becomes insignificant once leverage and 
maturity are removed or the time dummy is added. It is difficult explain exactly why this is. 
Sæbø (2015) has similar findings in his analysis. 
We find that the oil price is a significant variable with a positive effect on mispricing in 
model 3.  We do however witness that the variable is unstable, as it becomes insignificant 
when market leverage and maturity are removed in model 2. One would expect that an 
increased oil price would be risk reducing, especially for oil related companies. The sign of 
the coefficient in our regression may thus seem odd. The explanation may be that we rely 
solely on observations at issue and not the trailing spread developments. Once issued, the 
bond spreads are likely to be reduced when oil prices increase, as a result of increased 
profitability and lower default risk. The effect of oil prices in absolute levels at issue are, on 
the other hand, less obvious. Sæbø’s (2015) conclusion regarding the effect of the oil price is 
inconclusive, but his main regression finds oil price to have a negative effect on mispricing, 
which is more in line with our previous expectation.  
However, the inclusion of a time dummy representing the financial crisis pushes the oil price 
variable out of significance. The issue dates in our sample and the oil price on the respective 
dates, creates an evident linear relationship with a steady increase from the early 2000 and 
until our last issue observation in 201227. Even with the abrupt drop in oil price late 2008, 
the mean oil price in our sample is significantly higher post the financial crisis than prior, 
which poses a collinearity problem. This can also be seen from the correlation matrix in 
                                                          
27 See scatterplot in appendix 4I 
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appendix 3C, which shows a correlation factor of about 60 % for the time dummy and oil 
price. This observation might explain the positive coefficient of oil price discussed earlier in 
this section and might explain our wonder for why this is. It might simply be due to the fact 
that the oil price indicates the financial crisis, which in itself represents radical changes in 
several dimensions of the economy.  Hence, the positive coefficient of oil price does not 
have to represent a relationship between spreads/mispricing and the oil price, but rather 
the increased risk premium demanded after the financial crisis, as discussed in the previous 
section. 
Sæbø (2015) finds company size to be a significant factor in the spreads of Norwegian 
corporate bonds (in a sample of both HY and IG). However, we do not find this variable to be 
of significance in our sample. This might be due to the typical Nordic high yield issuer being 
relatively small. As seen from the firms in our sample, over 75 % of the firms have a market 
capitalization below 1 billion NOK.  
In this section we have given a thorough analysis of our regression outputs. Our findings 
indicate that there is a liquidity premium in the Nordic high yield bond market of about 110 
bps, and that the size of the issuer measured by the market value of equity does not entail a 
premium or discount. Furthermore, we find that investors demand a premium for investing 
in high yield shipping bonds of about 230 bps while industry classification in general has minor 
explanatory power. We support previous research done by Eom et al (2004) indicating that 
structural models struggles with properly incorporating the full effect of the leverage ratio 
and time to maturity, and Sæbø’s (2015) finding that the risk premium of HY bonds increased 
in absolute terms after the financial crisis. We do however note that the sample size is small, 
and out of sample testing has not been possible due to this fact. Hence the validity of our 
results must be interpreted with care. 
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7.5 Criticism 
In this chapter, we will present limitations of our thesis, points of improvements, and 
suggestions to future research. 
The main limitations of writing a master thesis is time, a fact also true for this one. Collecting 
data has been an extensive process, and a challenge in terms of the pure existence of data, in 
addition to their availability. This challenge has forced us to use several sources, thus creating 
challenges in terms of sorting and aligning different datasets, in addition to increasing the risk 
of measurement error. Lastly, choosing and understanding the models has been an exciting, 
but time-consuming maturation process. 
The novelty and limited size of the Nordic corporate high yield bond market is challenging in 
terms of obtaining a complete and bias-free dataset. This paper joins others in making the 
first steps to describe and understand this market. We have three points of improvement that 
can be done at a future time when the market is more mature, and a greater population of 
bonds is available for analysis. First of all, an increase in sample size and the ability to draw a 
truly random sample would better the robustness of our results. Second, we would be more 
likely to find significant determinants of loss given default. Third, we would be able to test the 
predictive power of our models in an out of sample test with observations not included in our 
sample. 
We have only used observations at the time of issue for our structural model, and time of 
issue and default for our recovery model. Using point estimates causes a risk of measurement 
error, as the time of observation could be highly significant for the output of our models. We 
have been forced to use point estimates, as comprehensive, continuous price data currently 
is unavailable for the Nordic high yield bond market. Nordic Bond Pricing AS is a subsidiary of 
Nordic Trustee with future plans to make continuous prices of corporate bonds available to 
the public. Future researches should make sure to utilize such a dataset when, or should, it 
become available. 
As elaborated in the theory section, many different variations of the original Merton model 
exists, most of them focusing on including different factors economic theory predicts should 
have an effect on credit risk. There are two additional factors we would especially like to test 
given more time. The first being an endogenously defined default barrier, as first done by 
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Black & Cox (1976). As explained in section 6.2.2, the default barrier is often defined as a value 
less than the book value of liabilities, due to the intuition that all debt rarely is due within the 
estimation period. As our sample consists of bonds with maturity ranging from 6 months to 
30 years, we think that being able to differentiate the default barrier, also between coupons 
and principal, could improve our models accuracy. The second factor we would like to include 
is stochastic interest rates, studied by Longstaff & Schwartz (1995) among others. The 
significance of their inclusion has been debated, but differing interest rate environments in 
world markets would make it interesting to test its inclusion in our study of the Nordic market. 
The structural models are criticized for utilizing unobservable variables and so we run the risk 
of biased input variables. An example is asset value/volatility, which is estimated using equity 
volatility. For low liquidity firms, equity volatility might be underestimated due to few 
observed price quotes. This would again cause underestimated asset volatility, which would 
cause too low modeled spread estimates. 
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8 CONCLUSION 
The main objective of this thesis was to identify and measure explanatory factors of observed 
credit spreads in the Nordic corporate HY bond market in the period 2000 – 2012.  From 
literature on credit pricing, we found three sources of risk compensation worth investigating; 
Default risk, liquidity risk, and market risk. 
We started off with creating a credit model to measure the part of the credit spread that 
could be explained by default risk, i.e. loss related to a default event. The spreads were 
estimated using an extended version of the Merton (1974) model, as found in Eom et al 
(2004). Loss given default, an important input variable in the credit model, was first 
attempted to be estimated individually for each stock. This was done by creating a model 
based on a multivariate OLS regression on a recovery dataset of 150 defaulted bonds in the 
market. However, the power of the recovery analysis was low, which might be due to two 
possible explanations. First, it might be due to low degrees of freedom after correcting for 
default clusters. Second, it might be due to the fact that the outcome of a default event is the 
result of a bargaining process between debt holders and debt issuer, which may be 
unsystematic and difficult, if not impossible to model. An interesting observation, 
nevertheless, was that subordinated and shipping bonds recovered significantly lower than 
the other subsamples. Due to the inconclusive results from the recovery analysis, the credit 
model were run using static recovery estimates of 40 percent, which is in line with other 
research papers and our recovery sample. 
The average spread predicted by the credit model was 340 basis points (bps), whereas the 
average actual spread in the sample was 518 bps. The average relative mispricing on a bond-
by-bond basis was 35 percent, which implies that the credit model explained as much as 65 
percent of the credit spread on average. Furthermore, the mispricing was found to be 
significantly lower for the bonds that were involved in a default event. We also discovered 
that default risk accounted for a greater part of the credit spread after the financial crisis in 
2008, and that the absolute value of the risk premium increased as well. 
The average relative mispricing is considerably lower compared to prior studies like Sæbø 
(2015), who finds an average relative mispricing to be 78.5 %. This is probably due to his 
inclusion of investment grade firms in his sample, where credit risk has a smaller relative 
impact than on high yield bonds. The direction of the difference of our and Sæbø’s (2015) 
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findings should be no surprise for market participants, but rather the surprisingly large 
magnitude. Our findings implies that more than twice as much of the spreads of high yield 
bonds are explained by credit risk relative to the bond market as a whole (Sæbø, (2015)), 
which gives an indication that structural models are more suitable for predicting spreads on 
high yield bonds, than on investment grade bonds.  
The unexplained part of the observed spreads amounted to 178 bps on average in absolute 
terms. With a multivariate OLS, we attempted to explain the part of the credit spread not 
explained by default risk using instrument variables for the other two sources of risk premium, 
i.e. liquidity and market risk. The R-squared we obtain with our regressions is about 22 %, and 
with a relative mispricing of 35 % this implies that still at least 27.3 % of the actual spreads 
remain unexplained.   
The results from the regressions performed are mainly in line with previous research, 
although with some deviations. “Shipping” is the only industry group in our sample proved to 
be consistently significant. Our analysis indicates that investors demand a risk premium of 
about 24028 bps for investing in HY shipping bonds relative to other industries, although the 
coefficient may be biased by our finding that the “Shipping” group has significantly lower 
recovery rates relative to the market average. Contrary to prior research by Sæbø (2015) we 
do not find industry grouping in general to be a major source of variation in mispricing.  
Our finding regarding the importance of the size of the issuer, a well-known Fama—French 
factor, is also deviating from the findings of Sæbø (2015), who found this variable to be of 
importance. We find this variable to have no significance on the mispricing of Nordic high 
yield bonds. However, this result may partly be explained by the relatively small issuer size in 
our sample, with 70 % having an equity market value of less than 1 billion NOK. 
A result more in line with theory, is our finding that investors demand a premium for investing 
in companies with low liquidity. Our coefficient implies a premium of ca 110 bps for 
investments in low liquidity bonds. We furthermore support earlier research done by Eom et 
al (2004) indicating that structural models struggles to correctly incorporate the impact of the 
firms leverage ratio and time until maturity. These variables are critical components of our 
credit risk model, which is the same model used by Eom et al (2004), and so the bias is 
                                                          
28 Highest estimate is 249.1 and lowest is 231.8 bps. See table 7.1 for more details. 
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indicated as we find both market leverage and maturity to be highly significant variables in 
our mispricing regressions.  
Although we note several interesting findings, our small sample size causes questions to be 
raised regarding the robustness of our results. Due to a large degree of heterogeneity in the 
preliminary sample, we have been forced to reduce the sample size significantly. Our results 
could be improved if the initial amount of eligible issues had been larger, and a random 
sample could be drawn.  A larger sample would also have made it possible to split our sample 
in two in order to further test the robustness of our regression model.  
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9 APPENDIX 
 
APPENDIX 1: HIGH YIELD SAMPLE OVERVIEW (SORTED BY DATE) 
 
Issuer Issue Date Issuer Issue Date
Seadrill Norge AS 03.10.2000 DNO International ASA 03.11.2004
DOF ASA 24.10.2000 DNO International ASA 03.11.2004
Crystal Production AS 27.11.2000 DOF ASA 07.12.2004
Frontier Drilling AS 20.12.2000 DNO International ASA 02.02.2005
Marine Harvest ASA 20.12.2000 Farstad Shipping ASA 07.02.2005
Marine Harvest ASA 20.12.2000 Aker ASA 02.03.2005
Marine Harvest ASA 20.12.2000 Aker ASA 02.03.2005
Marine Harvest ASA 15.03.2001 Prosafe SE 09.03.2005
Seadrill Norge AS 03.04.2001 Prosafe SE 09.03.2005
Northern Offshore LTD 06.04.2001 Odfjell SE 17.03.2005
DNO International ASA 01.06.2001 Sevan Marine ASA 31.03.2005
DNO International ASA 01.06.2001 DNO International ASA 06.06.2005
Marine Harvest ASA 14.06.2001 Seadrill Norge AS 22.06.2005
Fred Olsen Energy ASA 21.06.2001 Sinvest AS 22.06.2005
Bourbon Offshore Norway AS 16.07.2001 Norse Energy Corp. ASA 13.07.2005
UPM-Kymmene Oyj 23.01.2002 Eastern Drilling ASA 15.07.2005
UPM-Kymmene Oyj 21.11.2002 Sinvest AS 15.08.2005
UPM-Kymmene Oyj 21.01.2003 Songa Offshore SE 08.09.2005
DOF ASA 24.04.2003 Dof Subsea AS 16.09.2005
DNO International ASA 02.06.2003 Blom ASA 05.10.2005
Ocean Rig ASA 29.08.2003 DNO International ASA 12.10.2005
Fred Olsen Energy ASA 26.03.2004 DNO International ASA 12.10.2005
Prosafe SE 26.03.2004 I. M. Skaugen SE 14.12.2005
Fred Olsen Energy ASA 30.03.2004 Sinoceanic Shipping ASA 28.12.2005
DNO International ASA 03.05.2004 Deep Sea Supply AS 23.01.2006
TGS Nopec Geophysical Company ASA 05.05.2004 Sevan Marine ASA 31.01.2006
DNO International ASA 01.06.2004 Ignis AS 03.02.2006
DNO International ASA 01.06.2004 Norwegian Car Carriers AS 03.02.2006
I. M. Skaugen SE 02.06.2004 Wintershall Norge AS 15.02.2006
STX Europe AS 23.06.2004 Stora Enso Oyj 22.02.2006
DOF ASA 15.07.2004 COSL Drilling Europe AS 28.02.2006
Ocean Rig ASA 15.10.2004 DNO International ASA 02.03.2006
Ocean Rig ASA 15.10.2004 Odfjell SE 17.03.2006
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Issuer Issue Date Issuer Issue Date
Songa Offshore SE 24.03.2006 Telio Holding ASA 15.12.2006
Ocean Rig ASA 03.04.2006 Norgani Hotels AS 18.12.2006
STX Europe AS 05.04.2006 Sevan Marine ASA 20.12.2006
Stora Enso Oyj 13.04.2006 MPU Offshore Lift ASA 22.12.2006
Stora Enso Oyj 13.04.2006 Songa Offshore SE 22.12.2006
Stora Enso Oyj 23.05.2006 PetroProd Ltd 12.01.2007
PetroMena ASA 24.05.2006 Seadrill Ltd 23.01.2007
Vmetro ASA 29.05.2006 Seadrill Ltd 23.01.2007
Petrojack ASA 30.05.2006 Ability Drilling ASA 13.02.2007
Petrojack ASA 30.05.2006 Seabird Exploration PLC 14.02.2007
DOF ASA 13.06.2006 Island Drilling Company ASA 27.02.2007
I. M. Skaugen SE 19.06.2006 American Shipping Company ASA 28.02.2007
Tandberg Data ASA 27.06.2006 American Shipping Company ASA 28.02.2007
Tandberg Data ASA 27.06.2006 Nexus Floating Production Ltd 07.03.2007
Belships ASA 04.07.2006 Dof Subsea AS 09.03.2007
Interoil Exploration and Production ASA 11.07.2006 Odfjell SE 19.03.2007
Norse Energy Corp. ASA 13.07.2006
Remedial (Cyprus) Public Company 
Limited
28.03.2007
Seabird Exploration PLC 14.07.2006 Austevoll Seafood ASA 29.03.2007
Aker ASA 29.08.2006 Interoil Exploration and Production ASA 29.03.2007
APL ASA 20.09.2006 Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA 19.04.2007
MPF Corp Ltd 20.09.2006 Petrojack ASA 19.04.2007
Axel Springer Norway AS 27.09.2006 Kverneland AS 27.04.2007
Oceanteam Shipping ASA 27.09.2006 Kverneland AS 27.04.2007
Deepocean AS 04.10.2006 Interoil Exploration and Production ASA 02.05.2007
Eitzen Chemical ASA 04.10.2006 Reservoir Exploration Technology ASA 11.05.2007
Eitzen Chemical ASA 04.10.2006 Sevan Marine ASA 14.05.2007
Electromagnetic Geoservices ASA 02.11.2006 Norwegian Car Carriers AS 23.05.2007
DNO International ASA 29.11.2006 PetroProd Ltd 24.05.2007
Akastor ASA 01.12.2006 TTS Group ASA 24.05.2007
Akastor ASA 01.12.2006 Songa Offshore SE 01.06.2007
Akastor ASA 01.12.2006 I. M. Skaugen SE 06.06.2007
Akastor ASA 01.12.2006 Northern Offshore LTD 13.06.2007
Havila Shipping ASA 13.12.2006 Oceanteam Shipping ASA 18.06.2007
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Issuer Issue Date Issuer Issue Date
Aker Floating Production AS 05.07.2007 Hurtigruten ASA 06.03.2009
COSL Drilling Europe AS 06.07.2007 I. M. Skaugen SE 11.03.2009
Norse Energy Corp. ASA 06.07.2007 I. M. Skaugen SE 11.03.2009
Norwegian Energy Company ASA 13.07.2007 Austevoll Seafood ASA 30.03.2009
Norwegian Energy Company ASA 13.07.2007 Austevoll Seafood ASA 30.03.2009
Norgani Hotels AS 23.07.2007 Austevoll Seafood ASA 30.03.2009
Wega Mining AS 02.08.2007 Nokia Oyj 07.05.2009
Prosafe SE 15.08.2007 Bergen Group ASA 13.05.2009
Sevan Marine ASA 24.10.2007 DOF ASA 15.06.2009
EMS Seven SEAS AS 19.11.2007 Kverneland AS 17.06.2009
PetroMena ASA 19.11.2007 Kverneland AS 17.06.2009
DNO International ASA 29.11.2007 Akastor ASA 26.06.2009
Reservoir Exploration Technology ASA 13.12.2007 Akastor ASA 26.06.2009
Songa Offshore SE 17.12.2007 Bergen Group ASA 06.07.2009
DOF ASA 20.12.2007 Nattopharma ASA 10.07.2009
Aker Floating Production AS 24.01.2008 I. M. Skaugen SE 01.09.2009
Northern Offshore LTD 12.03.2008 Havila Shipping ASA 14.09.2009
Roxar AS 22.05.2008 EMS Seven SEAS AS 22.09.2009
Songa Offshore SE 16.06.2008 EMS Seven SEAS AS 22.09.2009
Petrolia SE 20.06.2008 Blom ASA 25.09.2009
Dof Subsea AS 28.08.2008 Prosafe SE 14.10.2009
I. M. Skaugen SE 16.09.2008 Seadrill Ltd 10.11.2009
Songa Offshore SE 22.09.2008 Norwegian Energy Company ASA 20.11.2009
Norse Energy Corp. ASA 25.09.2008 Norwegian Energy Company ASA 20.11.2009
Seadrill Ltd 30.09.2008 Odfjell SE 04.12.2009
Norse Energy Corp. ASA 05.12.2008 Bonheur ASA 15.12.2009
DNO International ASA 08.12.2008 Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA 17.12.2009
DNO International ASA 08.12.2008 Rem Offshore ASA 27.01.2010
DNO International ASA 08.12.2008 YIT Oyj 26.03.2010
Reservoir Exploration Technology ASA 11.12.2008 Eltek ASA 08.04.2010
Norse Energy Corp. ASA 19.12.2008 Kungsleden AB (publ) 30.04.2010
Scan Geophysical ASA 29.12.2008 Transocean Norway Drilling AS 30.04.2010
Nokia Oyj 04.02.2009 Sevan Marine ASA 04.05.2010
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AB Sagax (publ) 20.05.2010 Det Norske Oljeselskap ASA 28.01.2011
Amer Sports Oyj 11.06.2010 Morpol ASA 03.02.2011
Corem Property Group AB 08.07.2010 Transocean Norway Drilling AS 24.02.2011
Bergen Group ASA 09.07.2010 Transocean Norway Drilling AS 24.02.2011
Havila Shipping ASA 19.07.2010 Prosafe SE 25.02.2011
Electromagnetic Geoservices ASA 21.07.2010 Kungsleden AB (publ) 09.03.2011
DOF ASA 22.07.2010 I. M. Skaugen SE 15.03.2011
Sevan Marine ASA 10.08.2010 Cecon ASA 18.03.2011
Sevan Marine ASA 10.08.2010 Dannemora Mineral AB 22.03.2011
Stora Enso Oyj 01.09.2010 Havila Shipping ASA 30.03.2011
Stora Enso Oyj 01.09.2010 Havila Shipping ASA 30.03.2011
Interoil Exploration and Production ASA 14.09.2010 Blom ASA 04.04.2011
Lemminkäinen Oyj 14.09.2010 DNO International ASA 11.04.2011
I. M. Skaugen SE 17.09.2010 DNO International ASA 11.04.2011
Farstad Shipping ASA 27.09.2010 Amer Sports Oyj 13.04.2011
Norwegian Car Carriers AS 29.09.2010 CLS Holdings Plc 27.04.2011
Seadrill Ltd 05.10.2010 Norwegian Energy Company ASA 27.04.2011
FastPartner AB (publ) 06.10.2010 Norwegian Energy Company ASA 27.04.2011
Austevoll Seafood ASA 14.10.2010 Fred Olsen Energy ASA 12.05.2011
Kungsleden AB (publ) 18.10.2010 RusForest AB (publ) 12.05.2011
Bonheur ASA 29.10.2010 Electromagnetic Geoservices ASA 26.05.2011
Havila Shipping ASA 08.11.2010 Corem Property Group AB 30.05.2011
Panoro Energy ASA 15.11.2010 Keskisuomalainen Oyj 03.06.2011
Panoro Energy ASA 15.11.2010 YIT Oyj 20.06.2011
Aker ASA 23.11.2010 Stolt-Nielsen Limited 22.06.2011
Aker ASA 23.11.2010 Havila Shipping ASA 30.08.2011
Teekay Offshore Partners LP 29.11.2010 I. M. Skaugen SE 30.09.2011
Havila Shipping ASA 02.12.2010 EMS Seven SEAS AS 25.10.2011
Norwegian Energy Company ASA 06.12.2010 Songa Offshore SE 17.11.2011
DOF ASA 09.12.2010 Teekay Offshore Partners LP 27.01.2012
Sevan Marine ASA 22.12.2010 Aker ASA 30.01.2012
EMS Seven SEAS AS 23.12.2010 Austevoll Seafood ASA 07.02.2012
EMS Seven SEAS AS 23.12.2010 DOF ASA 07.02.2012
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Prosafe SE 08.02.2012 Havila Shipping ASA 30.08.2012
Bonheur ASA 10.02.2012 Stolt-Nielsen Limited 04.09.2012
Bonheur ASA 10.02.2012 Aker ASA 07.09.2012
Seadrill Ltd 13.02.2012 Tethys Oil AB (publ) 07.09.2012
Farstad Shipping ASA 15.02.2012 DOF ASA 12.09.2012
YIT Oyj 17.02.2012 Stora Enso Oyj 19.09.2012
Pacific Drilling S.A. 23.02.2012 Cermaq ASA 21.09.2012
I. M. Skaugen SE 27.02.2012 FastPartner AB (publ) 28.09.2012
Stora Enso Oyj 07.03.2012 Aker Solutions ASA 09.10.2012
BWG Homes ASA 12.03.2012 Fastighets AB Balder (publ) 10.10.2012
Amer Sports Oyj 15.03.2012 Austevoll Seafood ASA 15.10.2012
Amer Sports Oyj 15.03.2012 Oceanteam Shipping ASA 24.10.2012
BW Offshore Limited 15.03.2012 Millicom International Cellular S.A. 30.10.2012
Aker ASA 16.03.2012 Millicom International Cellular S.A. 30.10.2012
Stolt-Nielsen Limited 19.03.2012 Norwegian Energy Company ASA 30.10.2012
Stolt-Nielsen Limited 19.03.2012 Consilium AB (publ) 01.11.2012
Hurtigruten ASA 20.03.2012 Dolphin Group ASA 14.11.2012
Sanoma Oyj 20.03.2012 Stockmann Oyj Abp 19.11.2012
AB Sagax (publ) 22.03.2012 Odfjell SE 03.12.2012
Arise AB (publ) 23.03.2012 Odfjell SE 03.12.2012
Blom ASA 04.04.2012 BWG Homes ASA 12.12.2012
I. M. Skaugen SE 11.04.2012 Navigator Holdings Ltd 18.12.2012
Odfjell SE 11.04.2012 Havila Shipping ASA 20.12.2012
Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA 13.04.2012 Rem Offshore ASA 20.12.2012
Björn Borg AB 17.04.2012 Grieg Seafood ASA 21.12.2012
Teekay LNG Partners L.P. 03.05.2012 Northland Resources AB (publ) 21.12.2012
Blom ASA 23.05.2012
Aker Solutions ASA 06.06.2012
Songa Offshore SE 11.06.2012
Stora Enso Oyj 26.06.2012
Stora Enso Oyj 26.06.2012
Swedish Orphan Biovitrum AB (publ) 26.06.2012
Arendals Fossekompani ASA 06.07.2012
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APPENDIX 2: NUMBER OF BONDS EXCLUDED FROM HY-SAMPLE PER CRITERIA 
 
APPENDIX 3: ORDINARY LEAST SQUARED REGRESSIONS (OLS) 
APPENDIX 3A: OLS THEORY 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was used both to model recovery rates and to analyse 
credit spreads. We will therefore include a brief summary of the method and the assumptions 
required to attain unbiased and efficient estimators. 
OLS is a statistical method for estimating the parameters of a multiple linear regression 
model. The OLS estimates are obtained by minimizing the sum of squared residuals, and 
thereby the name. Mathematically, in the general case of k explanatory variable, the method 
generate estimates of ?̂?0, ?̂?1, …, ?̂?𝑘 in the equation: 
 ?̂? = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝑥1 + ?̂?2𝑥2 +⋯+ ?̂?𝑘𝑥𝑘  
By defining residuals 𝑢 as the difference between the observed value 𝑦 and the predicted 
value ?̂?, the estimators are found by minimizing the following expression: 
 ?̂? = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝑥1 + ?̂?2𝑥2 +⋯+ ?̂?𝑘𝑥𝑘  
For the OLS estimators to be unbiased and efficient, i.e. that the estimator’s expected value 
equals the population value and has the least variance attainable, five assumptions regarding 
the model must hold: 
1. Linear in Parameters 
The true model is linear in the parameters and can be defined as equation (2) 
2. Random sample 
The sample of n observations is random 
Exclusion criteria
# of bonds excluded by 
criteria
# of bonds left in HY 
sample after exclusion
Initial Nordic bond sample 23,515                                             
     - Investment grade bonds 21,511                                             2004
     - Bonds issued before 01/01/2000 112                                                   1892
     - Public sector, Financial institutions 603                                                   1289
     - Convertibles, linked notes, warrants 200                                                   1089
     - Non-public issuers or unavailible financial data 701                                                   388                                                   
     - Bonds issued after 31/12/2012 65                                                      323
86 
 
3. No perfect colinearity 
There are none perfect linear relationship among the regressors. 
4. Strict exogeneity 
The explanatory variables are exogenous. Consequently the errors have zero mean 
(𝐸[𝜀|𝑋] = 0) and are uncorrelated with the regressors (𝐸[𝑋𝑇𝜀] = 0). 
5. Homoscedasticity 
The error u has constant variance for any values of the explanatory variables, i.e. 
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑢|𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑘] = 𝜎
2 
It can be shown that under assumption 1-4 the OLS estimates are unbiased and under 1-5 
they are also the estimates with the lowest variance among competing methods29. In other 
words, under assumption 1-5 OLS is the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) (Wooldridge, 
2013). 
APPENDIX 3B: TESTING OLS ASSUMPTIONS IN THE RECOVERY RATE REGRESSIONS 
We have done tests to uncover potential violations of the OLS-assumptions in conjunction 
with the regressions performed to examine recovery rates in section 7.1. In tables and graphs 
below showing various regression specific statistics 
We performed a visual examination of correlation matrixes (table 3B.1) in order to investigate 
possible multicollinearity. No major issues regarding multicollinearity with the included 
variables described in our models have been found, except for receivables and long term 
debt. 
We have done visual examination of residual plots (table 3B.2), in addition to white-test in 
order to check for possible heteroskedasticity in our models but did not find indication of 
critical issues. 
We have found some deviation in our models from the assumption of normally distributed 
residuals (table 3B.3). The model is still unbiased, but the deviation may affect the efficiency 
of the model.  
                                                          
29 For explicit proofs of the OLS properties we refer to Appendix 3A in (Wooldridge, 2013). On page 
682 he proves that OLS estimators are the best linear unbiased estimators when the OLS assumptions 
1-5 are holds. 
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Table 3B.1 CORRELATION TABLE: EXAMINING MULTICOLLINEARITY 
 
 
UltimateRR DD LTD Intang Receiv EqRatio Prof SeniorUS Subordinated EandP OilService Shipping Industry TelecomIT
UltimateRR 1.00
DD -0.12 1.00
LTD -0.19 0.10 1.00
Intang 0.16 -0.10 -0.14 1.00
Receiv 0.24 -0.18 -0.55 0.20 1.00
EqRatio -0.01 0.20 0.23 -0.05 -0.33 1.00
Prof 0.07 0.03 0.07 -0.25 -0.05 0.16 1.00
SeniorUS 0.11 -0.05 -0.11 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.00 1.00
Subordinated -0.25 -0.01 -0.02 -0.11 0.09 -0.07 -0.02 -0.28 1.00
EandP 0.18 -0.05 -0.06 0.52 0.01 -0.13 -0.24 0.08 -0.19 1.00
OilService 0.00 -0.12 0.14 -0.41 -0.15 0.05 0.20 -0.13 0.08 -0.46 1.00
Shipping -0.30 0.09 0.00 -0.16 -0.14 -0.02 0.17 0.24 -0.09 -0.13 -0.23 1.00
Industry 0.03 0.07 0.16 0.08 -0.16 0.29 0.00 -0.08 -0.11 -0.16 -0.27 -0.08 1.00
TelecomIT 0.06 -0.05 -0.36 0.21 0.63 -0.19 -0.03 -0.03 0.22 -0.17 -0.29 -0.08 -0.10 1.00
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Table 3B.2 SCATTER PLOT: EXAMINING POTENTIAL HOMOSKEDASTISTITY  
 
Table 3B.3 HISTOGRAM: EXAMINING NORMALITY OF RESIDUALS 
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APPENDIX 3C: TESTING OLS ASSUMPTIONS IN THE CREDIT SPREAD REGRESSIONS 
We have done tests to uncover potential violations of the OLS-assumptions in conjunction 
with the regressions performed to examine mispricing. In tables and graphs below showing 
various regression specific statistics, model 3 is the source model, as shown in the analysis 
chapter 7.4. 
We have performed VIF-tests, as well as visual examination of correlation matrixes (table 
3C.1) in order to investigate possible multicollinearity. No major issues regarding 
multicollinearity with the included variables described in our models have been found, except 
for the time dummy and oil price, which is explained in detail in the analysis chapter 7.4. 
We have done visual examination of residual plots (table 3C.2), in addition to white-test in 
order to check for possible heteroskedasticity in our models. Both tests indicated 
heteroskedasticity issues, and therefore robust standard errors were used.  
We have found some deviation in our models from the assumption of normally distributed 
residuals, as can be viewed in the scatter plot (table 3C.3) on the following page. However, 
we assess the deviation to be sufficiently small to rely on the model framework. 
We have done a thorough investigation of outliers in the sample. This is an especially 
important task as we have cross sectional data of the companies, causing the risk of short-
lived time varying effects. E.g., Hurtigruten ASA went through a complex restructuring process 
at the time of their bond issue in 2009, which caused their equity market value to fluctuate 
greatly around the date of issue. We also choose to remove outliers with extreme market 
leverage ratios. Leverage is one of the key inputs of our spread model, and extreme values 
tend to massively overpredict or underpredict spreads. Hence, we have chosen to remove 
observations with leverage (total debt / market capitalization of equity) higher than 20 or 
lower than 0.1. We further remove variables with a market capitalization of more than 100 
billion NOK, consisting of three issues. These firms massively dwarf the size of the rest of the 
sample, and have an extreme impact on our regression coefficients. This process led to the 
removal of 8 outliers. 
We further found residuals, regression leverages, and the Cook’s D measure, in order to check 
for additional outliers. The found outliers were examined according to their observed 
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characteristics, as well as estimated factors not included in the model. This process causes us 
to remove in total 5 observations, which are shown and commented in appendix 4A. 
 
VIF TEST 
  
Variable VIF-stat
Oil and gas services 1.98
Oil and gas E&P 1.60
Shipping 1.52
Industry 1.44
Size 1.39
Leverage 1.23
Maturity 1.23
Security 1.17
Oil price 1.15
Price/book 1.12
Liquidity dummy 1.10
Return type 1.09
91 
 
 
Table 3C.1 CORRELATION TABLE OF VARIABLES: 
 
VARIABLE
Absolute 
mispricing
Maturity Size
Financial 
Crisis 
Price/
book
Oil price
Liquidity 
Dummy
Return 
Type
Market 
Leverage
Industry
Oil and 
gas 
Oil and 
gas E&P
Shipping Security
Absolute mispricing 1.00
Maturity -0.09 1.00
Size 0.00 0.41 1.00
Financial Crisis Dummy 0.09 -0.03 -0.02 1.00
Price/book 0.00 -0.03 0.08 -0.34 1.00
Oil price 0.04 0.05 -0.04 0.63 -0.17 1.00
Liquidity Dummy -0.11 0.01 0.10 -0.12 0.09 -0.18 1.00
Return Type 0.12 -0.03 0.05 -0.02 0.01 -0.08 0.02 1.00
Market Leverage -0.34 -0.08 -0.19 0.28 -0.27 0.18 -0.10 0.02 1.00
Industry 0.01 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.01 0.15 0.03 0.02 0.04 1.00
Oil and gas services -0.05 -0.10 -0.11 -0.18 0.04 -0.10 -0.09 -0.02 0.20 -0.31 1.00
Oil and gas E&P -0.01 -0.06 -0.13 -0.08 0.07 -0.12 0.10 0.17 -0.15 -0.16 -0.33 1.00
Shipping 0.16 0.06 -0.09 0.06 -0.07 0.07 -0.14 -0.20 -0.08 -0.15 -0.29 -0.15 1.00
Security -0.14 -0.08 -0.19 0.01 -0.06 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.19 -0.08 0.24 0.05 -0.16 1
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Table 3C.2 SCATTER PLOT: EXAMINING POTENTIAL HOMOSKEDASTISTITY  
 
Table 3C.3 HISTOGRAM: EXAMINING NORMALITY OF RESIDUALS 
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APPENDIX 4: ADDITIONAL TABLES FROM THE CREDIT SPREAD REGRESSION 
APPENDIX 4A OVERVIEW OF OMMITTED VARIABLES 
 
APPENDIX 4B: NUMBER OF BONDS PER INDUSTRY 
 
Issuer Issue date
Market 
Cap 
(MNOK)
Market-
Leverage
P/B
Year until 
maturity
Model 
spread
Comment
Frontier Drilling AS 20.12.2000 157             0.82          1.11      3.00          1,876 
Very high predicted spread close to our model 
roof. Together with a low/average leverage 
ratio, this indicates that something is wrong. We 
also observe an unrealistic high estimated asset 
volatility
Hurtigruten ASA 06.03.2009 56                94.71       0.01      3.00          
Removed due to restructuring at time of issue 
(spread not calculated)
Oceanteam Shipping ASA 24.10.2012 64                17.87       0.10      5.00          1,506 
Very high market leverage combined with an 
unrealistc high estimated asset volatility, which 
causes suspicion of measurement error
Stora Enso Oyj 13.04.2006 59,886       1.25          1.02      30.01       56       
Very large market cap and very long maturity 
which significantly differentiate the observation 
from the remaining sample, thus causing major 
regression leverage and biased results
Stora Enso Oyj 13.04.2006 59,886       1.25          1.02      30.01       56       
Very large market cap and very long maturity 
which significantly differentiate the observation 
from the remaining sample, thus causing major 
regression leverage and biased results
Industry Group Frequency Percent Cummulative percentage
Oil and gas services 120 38.71 38.71
Oil and gas E&P 45 14.52 53.23
Industry 42 13.55 66.77
Shipping 37 11.94 78.71
Other; 66 21.29 100
     Seafood 15 4.84
     Real Estate 13 4.19
     Pulp, paper and forestry 12 3.87
     Telecom/IT 12 3.87
     Agriculture 4 1.29
     Transportation 4 1.29
     Media 2 0.65
     Pharmaceuticals 2 0.65
     Consumer Services 1 0.32
     Utilities 1 0.32
Total 310 100
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APPENDIX 4C: NUMBER OF BONDS PER RETURN TYPE 
 
APPENDIX 4D: NUMBER OF BONDS PER SECURITY 
 
APPENDIX 4E: NUMBER OF BONDS PER CURRENCY 
 
APPENDIX 4F: NUMBER OF BONDS PER LIQUIDITY MEASURE 
 
 
  
ReturnType Frequency Percent
Floating rate = 0 205 66.13
Fixed rate = 1 105 33.87
Total 310 100
Security Frequency Percent
Senior Unsecured 247 79.67742
Senior Secured* 63 20.32
Total 310 100
*Includes 2 subordinated bonds
Currency of issue Frequency Percent
NOK 218 70.32
USD 52 16.77
SEK 25 8.06
EUR* 15 4.19
Total 310 100
* Includes 2 bonds issued in GBP
Liquidity Dummy Frequency Percent
High liquidity = 1 272 87.74
Low liquidity =  0 38 12.26
Total 310 100
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APPENDIX 4G: T-test of difference in maturity (equal variances)  
 
 
APPENDIX 4H: T-TEST OF MISPRICING FOR EXPLANATORY VARIABLES  
 
 
APPENDIX 4I: SCATTERPLOT - OILPRICE VS DATES OF ISSUES 
 
 
  
Variable Floating rate(Mean) Floating rate SD Fixed rate(Mean) Fixed rate(SD) P-value T-stat
Maturity 3.84 2.07 3.70 2.73 0.64 0.47
Variable Low Mispricing(Mean) Low Mispricing SD High Mispricing(Mean) High Mispricing(SD) P-value
Years until maturity 4.16 2.49 3.42 2.07 0.00
Coupon 6.87 2.83 8.38 2.88 0.00
Size 8789.20 14609.24 5044.21 9185.41 0.01
Price/book 1.88 2.68 2.07 3.48 0.60
Oil price 75.01 31.10 81.46 26.25 0.05
Liquidity dummy 0.90 0.30 0.85 0.36 0.18
Return Type 0.29 0.46 0.38 0.49 0.09
Market Leverage 2.58 2.94 1.67 1.52 0.00
Industry 0.14 0.35 0.13 0.34 0.71
Oil and gas EP 0.12 0.33 0.17 0.37 0.28
Oil and gas services 0.39 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.93
Shipping 0.08 0.28 0.15 0.36 0.06
Other 0.26 0.44 0.17 0.37 0.05
Financial crisis dummy 0.46 0.50 0.58 0.50 0.04
Security 0.19 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.93
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APPENDIX 4J: SCATTERPLOT - MARKET CAPITALIZATION OF EQUITY VS LIQUIDITY RATIO 
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APPENDIX 5: ADDITIONAL TABLES FROM RECOVERY RATE REGRESSION 
APPENDIX 5A: EXCLUSIONS FROM RECOVERY RATE REGRESSION DUE TO UNAVAILIBLE 
FINANCIALS 
 
APPENDIX 5B: NUMBER OF DEFAULTS PER INDUSTRY IN RECOVERY RATE REGRESSION 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 6: THEORY 
APPENDIX 6A: NORMAL DISTRIBUTION AND Z-SCORES 
When we explained the Black and Scholes’ framework for valuing options, we relied on 
normality assumptions, and further used the properties of a normal distribution to estimate 
probabilities using Z-scores.  
The normal distribution is a very common and widely used probability distribution. The 
assumption that a sample’s mean, e.g. stock returns, follow a normal distribution is explained 
by the central limit theorem in statistics, which states that the arithmetic mean of a 
sufficiently large number of independent random variables will be approximately normal 
Issuer Fiscal year
Amarant Mining Ltd 2008
EOAL Cyprus Holdings Limited 2011
EOAL Cyprus Holdings Limited 2012
EOAL Cyprus Holdings Limited 2006
MPF Corp Ltd 2007
Oceanlink Ltd NUF 2013
OSA Goliath Pte.Ltd 2008
PetroProd Ltd 2008
PetroRig III 2011
Industry N
Oil Services 42
E&P 20
Other 10
Telecom/IT 9
Industry 8
Shipping 6
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distributed, regardless of the underlying distribution. The normal distribution is illustrated 
below: 
 
The total area under the normal curve represents all probabilities of an event occurring, and 
is symmetrical about the mean. The x-axis represent the number of standard deviations from 
the population mean. The figure above illustrate that there is a 68 percent probability that a 
random observation will be within one standard deviation from the mean, and a 95 percent 
probability that it will be between two standard deviations. This property has many useful 
applications. In fact, by calculating the area under the curve, on can estimate the probability 
of any event occurring. Mathematically this is done using Z-scored, which is defined as: 
𝑍 =
𝑥 − 𝜇
𝜎
 
Where 𝜇 is the population mean, 𝜎 is the standard deviation, and 𝑥 is the score, or the event 
that the probability is to be calculated for. The Z score represent a point on the X axis above, 
and the probability to observe such an observation or lower is the total are under the graph 
to the left of this point. The probability is written as N(Z). The probability of observing and 
event larger than a given value is calculated as N(-Z), represented be the total area under the 
curve to the right of the given Z-score. 
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APPENDIX 6B: EXPLANATION OF EXTENDED MERTON MODEL FORMULAS 
In the paper, we applied a relatively complex formula for pricing defaultable coupon paying 
bonds, which we will give an intuitive justification for in the following. 
The applied formula is as follows:  
 
As illustrated above, the formula is the simply the sum of the expected payoff from coupons 
and the principal, which is discounted to present value by multiplying with the discount factor 
𝐷(0, 𝑇𝑖). The only difference between the two addends is that the principal is included in the 
latter by adding 1 into the equation. We therefore explain the second additive in detail, as 
the first addend will be understood in the same way. 
By multiplying 𝐸𝑄 into the brackets, the second addend can by written as: 
 
Where (1 +
𝑐
2
) is simply the principle and coupon payment, and w is the recovery rate. The 
first addend in Eq. 2 is relatively straightforward.  𝐸𝑄𝐼
(𝑉𝑇𝑖≥𝐾)
 is the probability that asset value 
is at or above the default barrier at time T, i.e. the probability of not defaulting. In that case 
the full principle and coupon is paid. The formula is directly comparable to 𝑁(−𝑑2) in the 
Black & Scholes formula, which is presented earlier in the paper: 
𝐸𝑄𝐼
(𝑉𝑇𝑖≥𝐾)
= 𝑁(𝑑2(𝐾, 𝑡)) 
where: 
1. Expected payoff from coupon 
2. Expected payoff from principal + last coupon 
𝑃(0,𝑇) = ∑ 𝐷(0,𝑇𝑖)𝐸
𝑄 [(
𝑐
2
) 𝐼
(𝑉𝑇𝑖≥𝐾)
+ min (
𝑤𝑐
2
,𝑉𝑇𝑖) 𝐼(𝑉𝑇𝑖<𝐾)
]
2𝑡−1
𝑖=1
+ 𝐷(0,𝑇)𝐸𝑄 [(1 +
𝑐
2
) 𝐼(𝑉𝑇≥𝐾) + min (𝑤 (1 +
𝑐
2
) ,𝑉𝑇) 𝐼(𝑉𝑇<𝐾)] 
(1) 
Expected payoff if not default 
Probability of default Probability of not default 
(1 +
𝑐
2
)𝐸𝑄𝐼(𝑉𝑇≥𝐾) + 𝐸
𝑄 [𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝑤 (1 +
𝑐
2
) ,𝑉𝑇) 𝐼(𝑉𝑇<𝐾)] (2) 
Expected payoff if default 
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𝑑1(𝑥, 𝑡) =
ln (
𝑉0
𝑥 ∗ 𝐷(0, 𝑡)
) + (−𝛿 + 0,5𝜎𝐴
2)𝑡
𝜎𝐴√𝑡
 
 
𝑑2(𝑥, 𝑡) = 𝑑1(𝑥, 𝑡) − 𝜎𝐴√𝑡 
The second addend in Eq. 2 represents the expected payoff for various default events, 
multiplied with the probability of the event occurring. Mathematically it is defined as: 
 
Where 𝜓 in this case represents the expected recovery value of the principle and the last 
coupon payment (𝑤 (1 +
𝑐
2
)). The intuition is that the promised payments are paid in full 
when the asset value A is greater than the default barrier K. When asset value is lower than 
K, but higher than the expected recovery 𝜓, the payout is limited to 𝜓. Lastly, if the asset 
value is lower than the expected recovery, the payout is equal to the asset value. 
The foregoing gave a detailed explanation of the second addend in Eq. 1, which calculate the 
expected payout of the principle and the last coupon payment. The same intuition and 
explanation can be used to explain the first addend, which relies on the same calculations, 
but only for the periodic payments and not the principal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
𝐸𝑄[𝐼𝑉𝑡<𝐾min⁡(𝜓,𝑉𝑡)] = 𝑉0𝐷(0, 𝑡)
−1𝑒−𝛿𝑡𝑁(−𝑑1(𝜓, 𝑡)) + 𝜓[𝑁(𝑑2(𝜓, 𝑡)) − 𝑁(𝑑2(𝐾, 𝑡))] 
Probability of 𝜓 < A < K at maturity 
Expected payoff if 𝜓 < A < K 
Expected value of 𝐴 if, and only if, A is below 𝜓   
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APPENDIX 6C: DERIVING DEBT VALUE USING OPTIONS 
Recall that equity can be defined as a call option on the firms assets A with strike equal to the 
face value of debt. 
 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝐹𝑉) (4.1) 
The value of the assets of a company can be defined as the sum of the equity and debt value: 
 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 = 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 (4.2) 
From substituting equity from (4.1) in (4.2) and rearranging, we get: 
 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 = 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (4.3) 
From put call parity we know that Eq. 4.4 must hold, or else an arbitrage opportunity would 
be present. 
 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒) + 𝑃𝑉(𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒) = 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛 + 𝑃𝑢𝑡 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒) (4.4) 
The Present value of the strike can be thought of as a risk-free bond with the same face value 
as the strike price, i.e. at maturity you are certain to be paid the value K, without any inherent 
uncertainty. In this thought experiment, remember that the strike price can be thought of as 
the face value of the total debt (FV) that the firms owes at maturity. Consequently, Eq. 4.4 
can be written as: 
 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝐹𝑉) + 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 = 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 + 𝑃𝑢𝑡 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝐹𝑉) (4.5) 
By substituting the Call option valuation from (4.5) in the debt formula (4.3), we get the 
following definition of debt: 
 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 = 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − [𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 + 𝑃𝑢𝑡 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝐹𝑉) − 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑]  
 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 − 𝑃𝑢𝑡 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝐹𝑉) (4.6) 
The resulting function (4.6) is that debt value is the same as a risk free-bond minus a put 
option on the firm’s assets with exercise price equal to the face value of the firm’s deb. 
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